CIA

• コラーゲン誘発関節炎、コラーゲン関節炎 collagen-induced arthritis
• 総腸骨動脈, common iliac artery

　

WordNet

1. the 3rd letter of the Roman alphabet (同)c
2. (music) the keynote of the scale of C major
3. a general-purpose programing language closely associated with the UNIX operating system

PrepTutorEJDIC

1. the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States米国中央情報局
2. carbonの化学記号
3. Channel Islands

Wikipedia preview

出典(authority):フリー百科事典『ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』「2017/12/15 20:53:57」(JST)

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CIA紋章

バージニア州マクレーンにある中央情報局本部。従来は同州のラングレーで、ここから“ラングレー”と言えばCIAの別名だった

中央情報局（ちゅうおうじょうほうきょく、英：Central Intelligence Agency、略称：CIA）は、外国での諜報活動を行うアメリカ合衆国の情報機関である。中央情報局長官によって統括され、アメリカ合衆国大統領直属の監督下にある。

概要

第33代大統領ハリー・トルーマンが諸外国から寄せられるバラバラの情報を、一括して収集できる組織を望んだことを契機に組織された。中央情報局（以下「CIA」）は、国家安全保障会議の直轄機関であり、アメリカ軍からは独立して存在している。

CIA自身が収集した情報の他に、国家安全保障局、国家偵察局、国防情報局、各軍の情報部、財務省情報部、エネルギー省情報部といったアメリカ政府の情報機関から構成されるインテリジェンス・コミュニティーからの情報を集めて分析し、大統領と国家情報長官に報告する。アメリカのインテリジェンス・コミュニティーは国家情報長官によって統括され、CIAはその「中央」にある情報機関である。

また、CIAは創設期からイスラエル諜報特務庁やイギリス秘密情報部とつながりが深く、また、カナダ、オーストラリア、ニュージーランドの情報機関とは、アングロ・サクソン連合として横の連携がある（UKUSA協定）。

活動内容

アメリカ合衆国の安全保障政策の決定に必要な諜報活動（ヒューミント）を行う。諜報活動のために膨大な予算を与えられているが、その用途などの詳細情報は明らかにされていない。

一般には以下のような活動があるといわれている。

• 現実社会での諜報活動/謀略活動
• 親米政権樹立の援助
• 反米政権打倒の援助
• アメリカ合衆国に敵対する指導者の暗殺
• 外国軍隊への拷問指導 - 中南米など。
• 外国のジャーナリストのスパイ・協力者獲得 - 日本など。
• 外国の保守政党の選挙に資金提供
• 外国の左派政党の弱体化
• 外国の与野党に親米政治家育成 - 日本など。
• 国内・国内でのスパイ養成
• アメリカ軍の戦闘地域での情報収集 - ヒューミントの他、無人偵察機を使用したものを含む。
• 外国の政治・軍事・経済情報の収集
• 外国での情報操作
• 反政府組織などの援助、人材育成

• インターネット上での諜報活動/謀略活動
• ハッカー養成
• 外国へのハッカー攻撃
• インターネットでの情報操作
• オンライン百科事典、アメリカ関連での荒らし、タグ大量貼り付け

他国の反政府勢力にも接触しているといわれる。例えば1950年代にはチベットの反中闘争組織チュシ・ガンドゥクを支援していた。

アメリカ合衆国に敵対する指導者の暗殺に関しては、フォード大統領によって暗殺禁止の大統領令が出されたこともあるが、今では撤回され、パキスタン、イエメンなどで無人偵察機プレデターでイスラーム主義テロ組織の指導者を暗殺している。

米軍が関与する戦闘地域へ潜入しての軍事的情報の収集に関しては、ベトナム・イラク・アフガニスタン等での戦争において、局員は現地へ潜入し敵性ゲリラ・民兵・テロリストの情報収集を行い、その拠点や隠処の爆撃時機・座標を米軍へ通知している。しかし、不正確な情報であることもしばしばで、誤爆による多大な民間人の犠牲を招いている。

2001年の9・11テロ後は、コマンド部隊によるテロリストの逮捕・殺害計画を極秘に企画していた。米政府の元高官によると、この計画は1972年のミュンヘンオリンピック事件後にイスラエル諜報特務庁が実行した報復作戦に類似しているという。

2006年5月、「テロリスト関係者若しくはそれらと接触した人物」をアメリカ入国の際に拉致し、国内法の及ばない地域（シリアやグァンタナモ米軍基地）の秘密収容所に、取調べを口実に収監していた事が判明して、アムネスティ・インターナショナルや母国政府が調査に乗り出す事態になっている。2006年9月、ジョージ・W・ブッシュ大統領は秘密施設の存在を認め、この秘密施設でのCIAによる取調べを「CIAプログラム」と表現した。バラク・オバマ大統領はグァンタナモ基地に対して厳しい姿勢で臨んだ。

2017年5月、北朝鮮の国家保衛省と国連代表部や対米外交を担当する韓成烈外務次官などはCIAと韓国の国家情報院が金正恩朝鮮労働党委員長の暗殺を試みたと主張し、暗殺に関与したCIA関係者や国家情報院トップの引き渡しと正式な謝罪を要求した。同時期に極秘に韓国訪問したCIA長官のマイク・ポンペオは金正恩体制への反乱煽動などを脱北した北朝鮮の元駐英公使と協議し、特定の国を対象としたものとしては初めてである北朝鮮を専門とした部署を新設しており、これに対して金委員長暗殺を目的とした動きとする見方もある。また、同年7月にはポンペオ長官は金委員長の排除を示唆している。

情報活動・公的刊行物

CIAは、秘密工作活動だけをやっているわけではない。情報本部、国家情報評価室、NIO（National Intelligence Officer）などで、情報評価活動をしていた。国家情報長官室（ODNI）が設立されるまで、CIAの情報評価はすべての基礎になっていた。特に軍部の意向に左右されない文官指導部への客観的な情報評価が期待されていた。

元々CIAは真珠湾攻撃で情報、評価活動が集約されず、大統領にまで多数の生の解読電文が評価無しでそのまま渡される上に、海軍と陸軍が別々に情報活動をするという弊害を是正するために生まれた。冷戦が始まりその性質が変化したが、「ソ連（など）の戦争準備に対して早期警報を出す」という基本任務がおろそかになったわけではない。

CIAの情報評価は、ごく一部は40年以上昔から一般公開されていた。

• 「ザ・ワールド・ファクトブック」・・・世界各国の現況をまとめている。
• 「情報研究」
• 「グローバル・トレンド」・・・CIAの下部機関であった国家情報会議（NIC:National Intelligence Council）が4-5年おきに発行していた20年後の未来予測、現在は独立したNICが発行する。日本関係の主要な論点では「人口減少が社会全体に影響を与えるので対処が必要である」と、かなり前から記述していた。ソ連崩壊は予測（または記述）できなかった（2035年版は2016年12月に新大統領に提出される予定で作業中。）。

日本への関与

日本占領期、占領終了後に岸信介、賀屋興宣、正力松太郎、児玉誉士夫、笹川良一、田中清玄、笠信太郎、緒方竹虎、野村吉三郎などをCIAの協力者として、揺籃期の自由民主党に活動資金を提供し、心理戦略委員会（en:Psychological Strategy Board。のちの作戦調整委員会）などの方針に沿って政治及びマスメディアを利用し、国内のアメリカニゼーションと政府の親米化に一役買った。

2006年（平成18年）7月18日に公開された国務省編纂の外交史料集によると、冷戦時代にはアメリカ政府の反共政策に基づき日本の親米勢力や、民社党などの野党内保守、右派勢力に秘密資金を提供していた。秘密資金の提供を受けたのは岸信介、池田勇人両政権下の自民党有力者と社会党右派（後に民社党を結党する勢力）とみられている。この結果、右派が民社党をつくり、日本社会党は弱体化することになった。

冷戦終結後、双子の赤字に苦しむアメリカ政府による人員や経費の削減等のため危機に直面したCIAは、日本等の友好国の経済情報などの非軍事分野での情報収集と分析を始めた。1990年（平成2年）4月には長官のウェブスターが「日本やヨーロッパ諸国の経済上の競争相手に対する情報戦略を扱う企画調整室を設けた。」と発言し、1992年（平成4年）4月には長官のゲーツが「業務の約4割、予算の2/3は経済分野に当てる。」と演説した。2011年には、上級オフィサーで2000年に没したロバート・クロウリーが遺した協力者一覧「クロウリーファイル」には、船橋洋一と、「C」の節に、コロンビア大学教授のジェラルド・カーティスが掲載されている事が明らかになり、協力者の一人であると名指しされている。

日本の指定暴力団ともコネクションを持つとされる。日本共産党には、岸の系列から統一協会へ関与していると主張された。

CIA日本支局を立ち上げたのは米国OSS（戦略情報局）スイス支局でアレン・ダレスの部下だったポール・ブルームで、彼が来日後に最初に連絡をとったのが笠信太郎であり、以降、ブルームと笠は日本の指導的知識人の糾合する目的の座談会を主催するなどして親米論調の涵養を図っていた。また、野村吉三郎（元海軍大将・駐米大使）に資金提供して海上警備隊（海上自衛隊の前身）を創設させ、野村の参院選出馬を支援している。反ソ・反鳩山の緒方竹虎を首相にするための工作活動を展開するとともに、緒方の「日本版CIA構想」を支援していた。正力松太郎を使って日本全土を縦断する一大反共軍事通信網を構築する構想があったとされる。（→正力マイクロ波事件）

吉田則昭、山本武利、加藤哲郎らは2008年（平成20年）4月から9月、アメリカ国立公文書記録管理局で2005年（平成17年）に機密解除され2007年（平成19年）1月12日に一般公開されたCIA公開資料を収集し、1年間をかけてその分析に共同であたった。2009年（平成21年）7月25日に早稲田大学20世紀メディア研究所の第51回研究会で中間報告を行い、2009年（平成21年）7月26日の毎日新聞で1面2面の大きな記事として報道された。 日本での活動拠点にニュー山王ホテルがある。

歴史

第二次世界大戦中の1942年に改組設立されたOffice of Strategic Services（OSS、戦略事務局）がCentral Intelligence Group（CIG、中央情報グループ）及びOffice of Political Coordination（OPC、政策調整局）を経て1947年に成立した国家安全保障法により改組され誕生した。

第二次世界大戦終了後、アレン・ダレスはドイツから多数のナチス将校を招聘して、CIAのソ連東欧での情報収集と工作活動の本格化を図った。1950年代から1960年代にかけては、社会主義・共産主義化しつつあったイラン、グアテマラ、コンゴ、キューバなどに対してクーデター・要人暗殺などを含んだ工作活動を積極的に展開した。

1989年にはCIA長官を務めた経歴を持つジョージ・H・W・ブッシュがアメリカ合衆国大統領に当選した。

2001年より子ブッシュ政権下では、CIAは機能が発揮されていないという指摘もある。ブッシュ政権下で勢力を増したネオコンなど保守強硬派は、CIAからの情報を軽視しており（プレイム事件など）、国防総省傘下の国家安全保障局（NSA）や国防情報局（DIA）を重視して、CIAはインテリジェンス・コミュニティーの主流派から外れた。こうした流れは、2010年頃まで続いた。ブッシュ政権でCIA長官だったポーター・J・ゴスは、それまでの最上級幹部を全て辞めさせ、大統領の政策に異議を唱えることを禁じる命令を出した。これによって、CIAの職員は2005年までに総員の半数が5年以下の経験しか持たない組織になった。

組織

• 職員数 - 約20,000人（はっきりした数字は定まらない。）

作戦本部

ヒューミントに従事する。英語名はDirectorate of operations。本部長はDeputy Director of CIA for operationsで、略称はDDO,DO,DD/Oなどを用いている。

以前は計画本部（1951-73）、作戦本部（1973-2005）、国家秘密工作本部（2005-2015）と称されていた

黎明期にはOSO（戦略作戦局、Office of Strategic Operations、情報収集担当）、OPC（政策調整局、Office of Policy Coodination、秘密工作担当）に分かれていた。

• 核拡散部
• 対テロ・センター
• 防諜センター
• 麻薬対策センター
• CIS部

• 欧州部
• 中近東・南アジア部
• 東アジア部
• アフリカ・中南米部
• 技術支援部

情報本部

情報の評価・分析、情報資料の作成に従事する。

• CIS分析部
• 欧州分析部
• 近東・南アジア分析部
• 東アジア分析部
• アフリカ・中南米分析部

• 兵器科学研究部
• グローバル問題部
• 情報資源部
• 外国指導者分析部

科学技術本部

技術的情報収集手段の研究・開発に従事する。

• 技術システム研究・開発部
• 傍受部
• 技術保障部
• 国外ラジオ放送部 (FBIS)

行政本部

総務、人事、訓練、要人警護、施設警戒に従事する。

• 人事部
• 要員訓練部
• 警備部
• 会計部
• 情報保管・検索部

• コンピュータ機材部
• 通信部
• 法務部
• 監察部
• 会計監査部

• 秘書部
• 会計計画部
• CIA史編纂部
• 暗号書簡部
• 公表検討会議

CIA長官

2005年4月21日まで（ボーダー・J・ゴスの任期中）は長官はCIAだけでなく、アメリカのインテリジェンス・コミュニティーの統括役でもあったため、「局」の字がない“中央情報長官”（DCI：Director of Central Intelligence) と呼ばれていた。2005年4月21日以降は専属の“中央情報局長官” （DCIA：Director of the Central Intelligence Agency）となり、インテリジェンス・コミュニティーは国家情報長官が統括している。

これはThe Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004（2004年の情報改革及びテロ予防法）により国家安全保障法が改正されたことを受けた措置である。

2005年まで、副長官も、中央情報副長官DDCIがおり、通常は中将が任命された（もっともCIA本部で勤務するが）。

CIAにおいては、工作本部や情報本部のトップが次官（Deputy Director）として扱われる。例えば工作担当次官はDDO、情報担当次官はDDIなど。が、CIA全体の副長官（Deputy Director）も別に存在する。

なお、CIAの日々の業務はExective Director of the Central Intelligence Agency（EXDIR）が総括することとなっている（2004年4月時点での組織図では、CIA長官のDeputyとしてDDCI、EXDIRのDeputyとしてD/EXDIRが記載されている）。

歴代CIA長官

代	氏名	任期	大統領
1	シドニー・W・ソワーズ海軍少将	1946年1月23日 - 1946年6月10日	ハリー・S・トルーマン
2	ホイト・S・ヴァンデンバーグ空軍中将	1946年6月10日 - 1947年5月1日	ハリー・トルーマン
3	ロスコー・H・ヒレンケッター海軍少将	1947年5月1日 - 1950年10月7日	ハリー・トルーマン
4	ウォルター・ベデル・スミス陸軍中将	1950年10月7日 - 1953年2月9日	ハリー・トルーマン/ドワイト・D・アイゼンハワー
5	アレン・ウェルシュ・ダレス	1953年2月26日 - 1961年11月29日	ドワイト・D・アイゼンハワー/ジョン・F・ケネディ
6	ジョン・マコーン	1961年11月29日 - 1965年4月28日	ジョン・F・ケネディ/リンドン・ジョンソン
7	ウィリアム・F・レイボーン退役海軍中将	1965年4月28日 - 1966年6月30日	リンドン・ジョンソン
8	リチャード・ヘルムズ	1966年6月30日 - 1973年2月2日	リンドン・ジョンソン/リチャード・ニクソン
9	ジェームズ・R・シュレシンジャー	1973年2月2日 - 1973年7月2日	リチャード・ニクソン
10	ウィリアム・コルビー	1973年9月4日 - 1976年1月30日	リチャード・ニクソン/ジェラルド・R・フォード
11	ジョージ・H・W・ブッシュ	1976年1月30日 - 1977年1月20日	ジェラルド・フォード/ジミー・カーター
12	スタンズフィールド・ターナー退役海軍大将	1977年3月9日 - 1981年1月20日	ジミー・カーター/ロナルド・レーガン
13	ウィリアム・J・ケーシー	1981年1月28日 - 1987年1月29日	ロナルド・レーガン
14	ウィリアム・ウェブスター	1987年5月26日 - 1991年8月31日	ロナルド・レーガン/ジョージ・H・W・ブッシュ
15	ロバート・M・ゲイツ	1991年11月6日 - 1993年1月20日	ジョージ・H・W・ブッシュ/ビル・クリントン
16	R・ジェームズ・ウルジー	1993年2月5日 - 1995年1月10日	ビル・クリントン
17	ジョン・M・ドイッチ	1995年5月10日 - 1996年12月15日	ビル・クリントン
18	ジョージ・J・テネット	1997年7月11日 - 2004年7月11日 （2004年6月3日に辞任）	ビル・クリントン/ジョージ・W・ブッシュ
	（長官代行）ジョン・E・マクラフリン	2004年7月11日 - 2004年9月24日	ジョージ・W・ブッシュ
19	ポーター・J・ゴス	2004年9月24日 - 2006年5月5日	ジョージ・W・ブッシュ
20	マイケル・ヘイデン	2006年5月5日 - 2009年1月20日	ジョージ・W・ブッシュ/バラク・オバマ
21	レオン・パネッタ	2009年1月20日 - 2011年6月30日	バラク・オバマ
22	デヴィッド・ペトレイアス退役陸軍大将	2011年9月6日 - 2012年11月9日	バラク・オバマ
23	ジョン・オーウェン・ブレナン	2013年3月8日 - 2017年1月23日	バラク・オバマ/ドナルド・トランプ
24	マイク・ポンペオ	2017年1月23日 - 現在	ドナルド・トランプ

CIAが主導ないし関与したとされる作戦・事件

1940年代

• 時期不明 - ペーパークリップ作戦

1950年代

• 1953年 - エイジャックス作戦：イラン・クーデター。シャー復帰。

  イギリス秘密情報部と合同で行なったイランのモハンマド・モサッデク政権転覆・パフラヴィー朝復興作戦。2013年、機密指定解除になっていた1970年代の文書に関与が明記されていたことが判明。

• 1953年 - ポダルトン作戦（正力マイクロ波事件）

  世界銀行より正力松太郎へ融資をさせ日本に軍事転用可能なマイクロ波通信網を設置しようとした。吉田茂が通信網は電電公社に任せると選択し失敗。

• 1954年 - PBSUCCESS作戦・グアテマラ・クーデター1954

  ユナイテッドフルーツと組んで行われた、グアテマラのハコボ・アルベンス・グスマン政権転覆作戦。グアテマラ内戦に繋がった。

• 1955年 - カシミールプリンセス号爆破事件
• 1955年 - 日本で保守合同を支援

  自由民主党の結成に関与した。1964年まで行われていた事が機密指定解除となった外交文書に記述されている。

• 時期不明 - MKウルトラ計画

  洗脳技術の研究を行った。1950年代初頭から1960年代末まで行われていたとされる。

1960年代

• 1960年代 - アコースティック・キティー

  猫を使った盗聴作戦。専用に生体改造された盗聴用の猫を盗聴先の現場へ送り込むというものであったが、失敗に終わった。

• 1960年 - U-2撃墜事件
• 1961年 - ピッグス湾事件

  キューバの「反革命傭兵軍」による親米化クーデターを支援し、「反革命傭兵軍」をピッグス湾から上陸させて政権転覆を狙ったものの失敗に終わった。

• 1961年 - 大韓民国中央情報部（KCIA）の設立に関与

  設立後は、育成、監督にも関与することとなる。

• 1962年 - コールドフィート計画

  ソビエト連邦の北極基地での情報収集

• 1963年 - ゴ・ジン・デイエム政権転覆支援：ベトナム
• 1963年 - アブドルカリーム・カーシム政権転覆支援

  イラクのバアス党への資金提供で関与したとされる。

• 1963年 - 1964年 - ルイス・ポサダ・カリレスへの支援

  カリレスはCIAの工作員であったが、後にクバーナ航空455便爆破事件やフィデル・カストロ暗殺未遂事件など一連のテロ活動に従事することになる。

• 1965年 - 9月30日事件

  インドネシアの反スカルノクーデター関与とスハルトによる共産主義者粛清への支援

ベトナム戦争関連

• 1964年 - トンキン湾事件
• 民間不正規戦グループ（CIDG）計画および、特殊部隊の支援
• 1967年～1971年 - フェニックス作戦

1970年代

• 1972年 - ウォーターゲート事件

  工作員のジェームズ・W・マッコード・ジュニアが逮捕された。

• 1973年 - チリ・クーデター

  社会主義政権のサルバドール・アジェンデ政権転覆をもくろみ、ピノチェト将軍のクーデターを支援。

• 1974年 - プロジェクト・ジェニファー

  沈没した旧ソ連の629型潜水艦K-129のサルベージ作戦。

• 1975年 - 労働党ウィットラム首相解任工作：オーストラリア
• 1977年 - パキスタン陸軍参謀長ジア・ウル・ハク将軍によるクーデター

  ズルフィカル・アリ・ブットパキスタン元首相が処刑された他、後のハク将軍事故死にも関与説がある。

• 1978年 - グラディオ作戦
• イタリアでの謀略活動
• 1978年 - アフガニスタン紛争

  この紛争に際してCIAがアフガニスタンに共産政権を打ち立てたアフガニスタン人民民主党に対する抵抗運動を行ったムジャーヒディーンへ武器、資金を援助した結果、紛争は1989年まで続いた。

1980年代

• 1980年 - チョン・ドハンによる光州事件：韓国
• 1980年 - カナダの策謀によりアメリカ外交官6人イラン脱出
• 1986年発覚 - イラン・コントラ事件

1990年代

• 1994年 - エイムズ・スパイ・スキャンダル

  約9年に渡りソ連とソ連崩壊後のロシアのために機密情報を提供していたとしてCIA工作員が逮捕された。

• 1998年 - スーダンの製薬工場へのミサイル攻撃

  実際は製薬工場であった所をVXガスの製造工場であると主張してミサイル攻撃を行わせた。これはエジプト人情報提供者一人のみの情報を信用した結果であった。

2000年代

• 2002年 - ベネズエラにおける、クーデター未遂、コロンビア人民兵による武装蜂起未遂。
• 2003年 - イラク戦争

  大量破壊兵器の存在を過大に主張して開戦へと導いた。後に大量破壊兵器はまったく存在しなかったとコリン・パウエル国務長官が謝罪する結果となった。

• 2009年11月5日 - イタリアでイスラム教聖職者アブ・オマル（オサマ・ムスタファ・ハッサン・ナスール）師の拉致への関与

  協力したSISMIのエージェントを含めた関係者達がイタリア司法当局に訴追され、欠席裁判でミラノの拠点責任者が8年、他に22人の要員が5年の禁固刑となった。

• 2009年12月30日 - アルカイダへの二重スパイの派遣

  CIAが派遣した人物は二重どころか、本来ならあり得ない三重スパイであり、完全に騙されたアフガニスタンのチャップマン前哨基地では自爆テロが発生した。CIA局員7人を含む9人が死亡。

• 時期不明 - 2001年のアフガニスタン紛争後のアフガニスタンにおいて成立したカルザイ政権内部の情報収集のために高官達へ資金提供

2010年代

• 2010年 - ウサーマ・ビン・ラーディンの殺害に係る事前調査

この他にも全世界で親米・反共工作（日本に対しても行われていた事は日本への関与で述べられている通り）を行うことによって、親米政権の確立、あるいは反米政権や特定社会集団の破壊に活躍してきた。なお、工作費用の捻出のために現地のみならず、アメリカ国内の黒人集住地域、ヒスパニック集住地域においても麻薬を販売する方式を未だに採用していること、および破壊工作に使用することから麻薬流通にも国際的に一役買っているとの主張もある。

有名なCIA局員（長官を除く）

• ジェームズ・アングルトン(James Jesus "Jim" Angleton) - 防諜担当副次官。専門は防諜（カウンターインテリジェンス）。
• レイ・クライン(Raymond S."Ray" Cline) - 情報担当次官。専門は情報分析。
• エドワード・ランスデール(Maj.Gen. Edward Geary "Ed" Lansdale,USAF) - 空軍少将、秘密工作のプロ、最終的に国防長官補佐官になる。フィリピン、ベトナム戦争初期とカストロ政権初期のキューバ攪乱工作で作戦の中心。
• ジェリー・ドローラー (Gerald F."Gerry" Droller) - 作戦本部西半球局秘密工作室長、キューバ侵攻作戦の中心人物で、アーサー・シュレジンジャーの回想録に唯一の中心人物として名字だけ出てくる。
• テッド・シャクリー (Theodore George "Ted" Shackley, Jr.) - キューバ侵攻作戦の中心のマイアミ支局（JM/WAVE）長、1968年サイゴン支局長。フェニックス作戦を指揮、西半球局長としてアジェンデ打倒工作、作戦本部副本部長（秘密工作担当）になる。イラン・コントラ事件や麻薬密輸への関与も取りざたされている。西半球局長として、フィリップ・エイジーの暴露から局を守るためにほぼ全員を入れ替える。
• E・ハワード・ハント（Everette Howard Hunt, Jr.） - 作戦本部の秘密工作員、グアテマラ政権転覆工作、キューバ侵攻作戦に従事。ウォーターゲート事件の主犯の一人、1950年代に東京駐在。ウォーターゲート事件中に夫人が100万＄を運んでいる途中墜落死。回想録を出版。その後息子たちが、本人がケネディ大統領暗殺に関わった（CIA在職中）という告白録を出版。
• ジェームズ・W・マッコード・ジュニア（James Walter "Jim" McCord, Jr.) - ウォーターゲート事件の主犯の一人。ニクソン大統領再選本部（CREP)警備責任者。CIAでの最後の役職は保安局施設警備部長。
• キム・ルーズベルト(Kermit "Kim" Roosvelt　Jr.) - カイロ支局長マイルズ・コープランド（Miles Copeland Jr.)とともに、ナセル体制を樹立。1950-54年工作本部近東局（Near East Division)長。シャーによるイランのモサッデク政権打倒、復位を主導（エイジャックス作戦）。OSSの幹部（解散後にOSSの公式の歴史を執筆）。2人のルーズベルト大統領の親族。回想録を出版し、エイジャックス作戦の詳細を記載する{{Refnest|group="注"|一部を削除したがあまりにも詳細なので問題になり、一旦出版停止になった。
• ピアー・デ・シルバ（Peer de Silva） - サイゴン、ソウル、バンコック支局長などを歴任。
• ビル・ハーベイ (William King "Bill" Harvey) - CIAを代表する伝説の秘密工作員。ベルリンの「ゴールド作戦」の責任者。勤務中に公然と拳銃を携帯するので局内で悪名が高かった。工作本部対外情報室長。1945年、FBI在職中にエリザベス・ベントリーを尋問し、米国政府内のソ連スパイグループを特定した。FBIからCIAに移籍したため、フーヴァーFBI長官から嫌われ続ける。
• ビクター・マルケッティ（Victor L. Marchetti) - 中央情報副長官（DDCI)タイラー（Rufus L.Taylor）海軍中将の補佐官。分析官出身。
• サム・アダムス（Samuel A. "Sam" Adams） - 情報本部の分析官。回想録を執筆。
• J・C・キング大佐(Colonel J.C.King) - 作戦本部西半球局長
• リチャード・ビッセル(Richard Marvin "Dick" Bissel) - 作戦本部長（次官）
• クレア・ジョージ (Clair Erloy George) - 作戦本部長（次官、1984-87）。OSSのベテラン。
• ルシアン・コネイン大佐 (Colonel Lucien Emile Phellipe Conein) - 駐南ベトナムの専門家。南ベトナムの将軍に信頼されてジェム政権を倒すクーデターに関与する。
• ジョン・リチャードソン (John Hammond "John" Richardson) - サイゴン支局長（ゴ・ジン・ジェム時代）。ジェム政権と密着しすぎると言われて、反ジェムクーデター直前に帰国させられる。
• オルドリッチ・エイムズ(Aldrich Hazen Ames) - CIA対ソ連諜報部長、在職中にソ連のスパイ(1984-94)。ほぼ全員のソ連人スパイが逮捕されたり処刑されたりした。
• ロバート・ベア - 回想録を出版。
• リチャード・ブリー (Richard Blee)
• ハンス・トフテ（Hans V. Tofte) - 伝説的な上級工作員。朝鮮戦争中の破壊工作で有名。自宅に機密文書を保管していたのがわかり、解任される。
• コファー・ブラック (Joseph Cofer Black) - アフリカ専門家。反テロリズムセンター長としてアル・カイーダと戦う。
• リチャード・ウェルチ(Richard Welch) - アテネ支局長（暗殺される）
• ラリー・デブリン(Lawrence "Larry" Devlin) - コンゴ支局長、チャーチ委員会の報告では「ビクター・ヘッジマン」。
• ヘンリー・プレザンツ(Henry M.Pleasants） - ベルン支局長。ボン（西ドイツ）支局長としてゲーレン機関の設立と発展に尽力する。
• デズモンド・フィッツジェラルド（J.Desmond FitzGerald） - 工作本部長(1965-67)、次官。前極東局長。
• ルシアン・トラスコット将軍（Lucian Truscott） - サイゴン支局長
• ジョン・マクマホン（John Newton "John" McMahon） - サイゴン支局長、後に工作本部長(1978-81)、中央情報副長官（DDCI、1982-86)
• トレーシー・バーンズ（Tracy F.Barnes）
• フランシス・ゲーリー・パワーズ(Francis Gary Powers） - 1960年ソ連上空で撃墜されたU-2型偵察機のパイロット。
• チャールズ・キャベル空軍大将（Gen. Charles Pearre Cabell,USAF） - 中央情報副長官（DDCI、1953-62)。キューバ侵攻作戦やU-2偵察機開発を推進。
• デーブ・マーフィー（David R."Dave" Murphy) - パリ支局長。アングルトンにソ連スパイの疑いをかけられ辞任した最上位のCIA高官。
• パット・カーター中将（Lt.Gen. Marshal Sylvester "Pat" Carter) - 中央情報副長官（DDCI、1962-65)
• カール・ダケット（Carl Duckett） - 科学技術本部長
• ビル・ネルソン（William E."Bill "Nelson) - 作戦本部長(1973-76)、
• マックス・ヒューゲル（Max C. Hugel) - 短期間総務本部長を務めた後、工作本部長。CIAなどでの情報活動経験が全くない部外者のため在任2ヶ月で辞任させられる。
• デビッド・フィリップス(David Atlee Phillips） - 工作本部西半球局長、CIA退職官協会会長。ケネディ暗殺事件との関係が疑われている。
• シドニー・ゴトリーブ博士（Dr.Sidney Gottlieb） - 毒物専門家、MKウルトラ計画やカストロ暗殺計画の技術的中心人物。
• フランク・ウィズナー（Frank Gardiner Wisner） - 次官、計画本部長。フランク・ジョージ・ウィズナー（国防次官、国務次官などを歴任）は息子。
• ドナルド・グレッグ（Donald Gregg) - ソウル支局長、元東京支局勤務。ジョージ・H・W・ブッシュ大統領の腹心として、駐韓大使、国家安全保障会議情報部長やCIAの要職を歴任。
• バーノン・ウォーターズ中将（Lt.Gen. Vernon Anthony "Dick" Walters) - 中央情報副長官(1972-76)。リチャード・ニクソン大統領の古い知り合い。ウォーターゲート事件のもみ消しを頼まれるが、断る。退任後に国連大使、駐西ドイツ大使を歴任。
• ウィリアム・ブロー（William Vincent "Bill" Broe） - 1965年まで東京支局長を勤めた直後に西半球局長に就任し、サルバドール・アジェンデ打倒工作、ゲバラ捕獲作戦を指揮した重要人物である。その後1973年の引退まで監察総監として勤務し、ウォーターゲート事件の局内調査を指揮する。
• フィリップ・エイジー（Philip Burnett Franklin Agee） - 1957-68年の中南米での活動後、キューバ（共産主義国）に移住し、そこで死亡した。1975年に局員、協力者250名の実名・局内暗号名(cryptonym)を載せた回想録を出版する。
• ロバート・クロウリー（Robert Trumbull Crowley） - 工作本部担当副長官補までなった高官。肺ガンで死亡する前に、CIAの協力者氏名2619人の実名を記した「クロウリー・ファイル」を公開した。
• ロバート・クッシュマン海兵隊大将（General Robert Everton Cushman, Jr.） - 中央情報副長官（1969-71、当時は中将)、海兵隊司令官（1972-75、大将）
• ジョージ・ドール（George Arntzen Doole, Jr.） - 1953年－71年（ベトナム戦争と重なる）にCIA所有の航空事業すべてをほぼ一人で統括する職員。
• ウィリアム・カンパイルズ（William Peter Kampiles） - CIAの下級事務員。1977年にKH-11偵察衛星のマニュアルを$3,000でソ連に売る。二重スパイになれると思って元の上司に報告したが、捕らえられ懲役19年の刑を受ける（1996年釈放）。
• エドワード・スノーデン（Edward Joseph Snowden） - CIA勤務（2002-06）、本部やベルン支局で情報保全勤務と秘密工作にも携わる。その後NSAの契約職員になる。NSAホノルル・センター時代に入手した多数の資料を持って、内部告発者となり、ガーディアンなどで資料を発表。2015年現在ロシア滞在。
• ジェイク・エスターライン（Jacob Donald "Jake" Esterline） - キューバ侵攻作戦の中枢である西半球局第4部（WH/4)長。その後マイアミ支局長、西半球局次長。
• シャーマン・ケント（Sherman Kent） - OSSの調査分析部門で活躍。1952-67年国家評価室（ONE：Office of National Estimates）の長として、アメリカの情報評価業務を率いる
• ウィリアム・ランガー（William Leonard Langer） - OSSで情報評価に活躍。CIAで国家評価室を設立した後、ハーバード大学歴史学部長になる。弟のウォルター・ランガー（Walter Charles Langer）はOSSでヒトラーの精神分析をし、自殺を予言したことで有名。
• ボビー・インマン海軍大将（Adm. Bobby Ray Inman,USN) - 中央情報副長官（DDCI、1981-82）。海軍情報部長（1974-76）、国防情報局長官(1976-77)、国家安全保障局長官(1977-81)。退任後ダラス連邦準備銀行総裁(1987-90)。1993年クリントンにより国防長官に指名されるが辞退する。
• ロブ・シモンズ陸軍大佐(Robert Ruhl "Rob" Simmons） - CIA在職1969-79。元上院情報委員会事務局長。2001-2007連邦下院議員。ベトナムでベトコン尋問センター勤務後、1975-1978年台北支局で台湾の核武装計画を阻止するのに重要な役割を果たす。
• ジョージ・キスヴァルター（George Kisevalter） - 戦後CIAのためのソ連人スパイとなった多くの重要人物のハンドラー（担当官）。特にポポフ少佐、オレグ・ペンコフスキー大佐、アナトリー・ゴリティン、ユーリ・ノーセンコ少佐。ゴリティンとノーセンコ両方を信用していたと言う。
• ローレンス・ヒューストン（Lawrence R. Houston） - CIA法律顧問
• ヴァレリー・プレイム（Valerie Elise Wilson） - 大量破壊兵器捜索担当の秘密情報員（民間会社員を偽装）。夫（大使）の活動が気に入らない政府首脳により、身分を新聞に漏洩される。それらの顛末はプレイム事件と呼ばれた。（「フェア・ゲーム」として映画化もされた。）
• ウィリアム・バンディ（William Putnam "Bill" Bundy）- 後に国務次官補、国防次官補、プリンストン大学教授を務め、外交問題評議会（CFR）会長に推薦されるが断る。マクジョージ・バンディ（ケネディ、ジョンソン政権の国家安全保障担当大統領特別補佐官）の兄。1950年代にCIA勤務、エイモリ（Robert Amory Jr.）情報本部担当次官の特別補佐官を務める。アルジャー・ヒスに献金したため、ジョセフ・マッカーシー上院議員の追求を受けるが、ダレス長官などがかばう。また左翼的見解を攻撃され心に傷を負う。第二次世界大戦中はイギリスの通信情報機関政府暗号学校(GCCS)で在英勤務（所属はアメリカ陸軍）。
• ロバート・ウィリアム・コウマー（Robert William "Blowtorch Bob" Komer）創立初期にCIA局員、後にNSC職員、国家安全保障担当大統領特別補佐官代行、カーター政権で国防次官。ベトナムで平定計画、CORDS、フェニックス作戦を指揮する。

ポップ・カルチャーにおけるCIA

小説

※欧米の主なスパイ小説の一部に登場している。日本でも『007シリーズ』によって名が広まることとなった。

• トム・クランシーによる『ジャック・ライアンシリーズ』、その他長編
• ロバート・ラドラムによる『ジェイソン・ボーン』三部作、その他長編
• 大沢在昌による『追跡者の血統』『秋に墓標を』『氷舞』、その他長編
• 大藪春彦による『伊達邦彦シリーズ』、その他長編
• 平井和正による『ウルフガイシリーズ』および『アダルト・ウルフガイシリーズ』、『死霊狩り』他

映画

• 『コードネームはファルコン』
• 『サンチャゴに雨が降る』
• 『007シリーズ』

• 『007 ドクター・ノオ』
• 『007 ロシアより愛をこめて』
• 『007 ゴールドフィンガー』

• 『Killers』
• 『アルゴ』
• 『今そこにある危機』
• 『イントゥ・ザ・サン』
• 『エージェント・コーディ』
• 『エル・マリアッチ』
• 『グッド・シェパード』
• 『グリーン・ゾーン』
• 『刑事ニコ/法の死角』
• 『五月の七日間』
• 『コンドル』
• 『ザ・シューター/極大射程』
• 『シリアナ』
• 『スパイ・ゲーム』
• 『ゼロ・ダーク・サーティ』
• 『ソルト』
• 『チャーリー・ウィルソンズ・ウォー』
• 『沈黙の陰謀』
• 『デスペラード』
• 『デンジャラス・ラン』
• 『トータル・フィアーズ』
• 『バーン・アフター・リーディング』
• 『ハドソン・ホーク』
• 『ボーンシリーズ』

• 『ボーン・アイデンティティー』
• 『ボーン・スプレマシー』
• 『ボーン・アルティメイタム』

• 『暴走特急』
• 『ミッション:インポッシブル』
• 『リクルート』
• 『レジェンド・オブ・メキシコ/デスペラード』
• 『レッド・オクトーバーを追え!』
• 『ワールド・ウォーZ』

テレビドラマ

• 『スパイ大作戦』
• 『24 -TWENTY FOUR-』
• 『CIA:ザ・エージェンシー』
• 『HOMELAND』
• 『エイリアス』
• 『コバート・アフェア』
• 『チャック』
• 『超音速攻撃ヘリ エアーウルフ』
• 『バーン・ノーティス 元スパイの逆襲』

漫画

• 『8マン』
• 『ゴルゴ13』
• 『パタリロ!』
• 『名探偵コナン』
• 『ロケットマン』

アニメ

• 『攻殻機動隊 STAND ALONE COMPLEX』

• 『攻殻機動隊 S.A.C. 2nd GIG』

• 『名探偵コナン』
• 『ルパン三世 アルカトラズコネクション』

関連人物ほか

• 関係人物

• 岸信介　- ティム・ワイナーの著書でスパイと名指しされた。
• 正力松太郎　- ティム・ワイナーの著書でスパイと名指しされた。
• 船橋洋一
• ジェラルド・カーティス
• ジム・トンプソン (実業家)
• クレア・リー・シェンノート
• ウサーマ・ビン＝ラーディン

• 関係企業

• ユナイテッド・フルーツ
• 民航空運公司
• エア・アメリカ
• 国際商業信用銀行
• ブラックウォーターUSA

• 関係機関・協力機関

• アメリカ対日協議会
• 文化自由会議
• 全米民主主義基金
• アメリカ合衆国国際開発庁
• タビストック人間関係研究所

• 類似機関

• イギリス情報局秘密情報部
• イスラエル諜報特務庁
• ソ連国家保安委員会
• ロシア連邦保安庁
• 大韓民国中央情報部 (KCIA)

関連項目

• モサド
• MI6
• FBI
• リチャード・ニクソン - チリ・クーデターの際の大統領
• インテリジェンス・コミュニティー
• 国家情報会議
• 死の部隊
• ザ・ワールド・ファクトブック (CIA World Factbook)
• アメリカ同時多発テロ事件陰謀説
• エシュロン
• en:William F. Buckley, Jr.の創刊した雑誌en:National Review

参考文献

• ウィリアム・ブルム『アメリカの国家犯罪全書』（作品社）
• 有馬哲夫『原発・正力・CIA : 機密文書で読む昭和裏面史』（新潮社、2008年2月）ISBN 978-4-10-610249-3
• 有馬哲夫『日本テレビとCIA : 発掘された「正力ファイル」』（新潮社、2006年10月）ISBN 978-4-10-302231-2
• 有馬哲夫:著・文・その他『「スイス諜報網」の日米終戦工作 : ポツダム宣言はなぜ受けいれられたか』（新潮選書、2015年6月25日）ISBN 978-4-10-603772-6
• 春名幹男『秘密のファイル : CIAの対日工作』上下巻（共同通信社、2000年）ISBN 978-4-7641-0453-2 ISBN 978-4-7641-0454-9
• H.キース・メルトン、ロバート・ウォレス:著。北川玲:訳『CIA極秘マニュアル : 日本人だけが知らないスパイの技術』（創元社、2013年）ISBN 978-4-422-30061-0 原タイトル en:H. Keith Melton,Robert Wallace『The Official CIA Manual of Trickery and Deception』ISBN 978-0-06-172589-0
• 吉田則昭『緒方竹虎とCIA : アメリカ公文書が語る保守政治家の実像 平凡社新書 ; 639』（平凡社、2012年5月）ISBN 978-4-582-85639-2
• ジョビー・ウォリック:著。黒原敏行:訳『三重スパイ : CIAを震撼させたアルカイダの「モグラ」』（太田出版、2012年12月）ISBN 978-4-7783-1346-3　原タイトル　en:Joby Warrick『THE TRIPLE AGENT : The al-Qaeda Mole who Infiltrated the CIA』ISBN 978-0-385-53418-5
• ティム・ワイナー:著。藤田博司、山田侑平、佐藤信行:訳『CIA秘録 : その誕生から今日まで』上下巻（文藝春秋、2008年11月）ISBN 978-4-16-370800-3 ISBN 978-4-16-370810-2　原タイトル　en:Tim Weiner『Legacy of ashes : The History of the CIA』ISBN 978-1-84614-046-4 ISBN 978-0-385-51445-3
• 田岡俊次『2時間でわかる図解 日本を囲む軍事力の構図 : 北朝鮮、中国、その脅威の実態。アメリカの軍事覇権の将来は? (2時間でわかる図解シリーズ)』（中経出版、2003年9月18日）ISBN 978-4-8061-1872-5
• Robert Trumbull Crowley『The Crowley Files』
• ハワード・ションバーガー:著。袖井林二郎:訳『ジャパニーズ・コネクション : 海運王K.スガハラ外伝』（文芸春秋、1995年12月）ISBN 978-4-16-350920-4 原タイトル Howard B Schonberger『Nisei entrepreneur : a political biography of Kay Sugahara』
• ウィリアム・E.コルビー:著。大前正臣、山岡清二:訳『栄光の男たち : コルビー元CIA長官回顧録』（政治広報センター、1980年）全国書誌番号:84055556　原タイトル　William Egan Colby『Honorable men : My life in the CIA』ISBN 978-0-09-134820-5 ISBN 978-0-671-22875-0
• 角間隆『ドキュメント日商岩井 : 巨大エスタブリッシュメントへの生贄』（徳間書店、1979年6月）全国書誌番号:79020689
• 日本共産党:著。日本共産党中央委員会出版局:編『韓国の謀略機関 : 国際勝共連合=統一協会』（日本共産党中央委員会出版局、1978年6月）全国書誌番号:78022043
• 山岡清二『霧の中のCIA : 秘密情報機関の現代的意義と功罪』（政治広報センター、1977年4月）全国書誌番号:77018801
• 松浦総三『現代ジャーナリズム事件誌 : 最近『文春』誌学・『週刊新潮』論他』 (白川書院、1977年2月)全国書誌番号:77009837
• 川端治『自民党 : その表と裏』（新日本出版社、1963年）全国書誌番号:63009382
• 海野弘『スパイの世界史』（文藝春秋、2003年）
• 海野弘『陰謀の世界史』（文藝春秋）
• ブライアン・フリーマントル『CIA』（新潮選書、1984年）

外部リンク

• CIAサイト（英語）
• The World Factbook（英語）
• Central Intelligence Agency (@CIA) - Twitter
• Central Intelligence Agency - Facebook
• Records of the Central Intelligence Agency (RG 263
• 2,619 CIA Sources: The Crowley Files

wiki en

[Wiki en表示]

"CIA" redirects here. For other uses, see CIA (disambiguation).

Central Intelligence Agency

Seal of the Central Intelligence Agency
Flag of the Central Intelligence Agency
Intelligence agency overview
Formed	September 18, 1947 (1947-09-18)
Preceding Intelligence agency	Office of Strategic Services
Headquarters	George Bush Center for Intelligence Langley, Virginia, United States 38°57′07″N 77°08′46″W
Motto	"The Work of a Nation. The Center of Intelligence." Unofficial motto: "And you shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free." (John 8:32)
Employees	21,575 (estimate)
Annual budget	$15 billion (as of 2013)
Intelligence agency executives	Mike Pompeo, Director Gina Haspel, Deputy Director
Parent Intelligence agency	None (independent)
Website	cia.gov

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is a civilian foreign intelligence service of the United States federal government, tasked with gathering, processing, and analyzing national security information from around the world, primarily through the use of human intelligence (HUMINT). As one of the principal members of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC), the CIA reports to the Director of National Intelligence and is primarily focused on providing intelligence for the President and Cabinet.

Unlike the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which is a domestic security service, the CIA has no law enforcement function and is mainly focused on overseas intelligence gathering, with only limited domestic intelligence collection. Though it is not the only U.S. government agency specializing in HUMINT, the CIA serves as the national manager for coordination of HUMINT activities across the US intelligence community. Moreover, the CIA is the only agency authorized by law to carry out and oversee covert action at the behest of the President. It exerts foreign political influence through its tactical divisions, such as the Special Activities Division.

Before the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, the CIA Director concurrently served as the head of the Intelligence Community; today, the CIA is organized under the Director of National Intelligence (DNI). Despite transferring some of its powers to the DNI, the CIA has grown in size as a result of the September 11 attacks. In 2013, The Washington Post reported that in fiscal year 2010, the CIA had the largest budget of all IC agencies, exceeding previous estimates.

The CIA has increasingly expanded its role, including covert paramilitary operations. One of its largest divisions, the Information Operations Center (IOC), has shifted focus from counter-terrorism to offensive cyber-operations.

Purpose

When the CIA was created, its purpose was to create a clearinghouse for foreign policy intelligence and analysis. Today its primary purpose is to collect, analyze, evaluate, and disseminate foreign intelligence, and to perform covert actions.

According to its fiscal 2013 budget, the CIA has five priorities:

• Counterterrorism, the top priority
• Nonproliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.
• Warning/informing American leaders of important overseas events.
• Counterintelligence
• Cyber intelligence.

Organizational structure

Mike Pompeo, the current director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Chart showing the organization of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Main article: Organizational structure of the Central Intelligence Agency

The CIA has an executive office and five major directorates:

• The Directorate of Digital Innovation
• The Directorate of Analysis
• The Directorate of Operations
• The Directorate of Support
• The Directorate of Science and Technology

Executive Office

The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (D/CIA) reports directly to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI); in practice, the CIA director interfaces with the DNI, Congress, and the White House, while the Deputy Director is the internal executive of the CIA.

The Executive Office also supports the U.S. military by providing it with information it gathers, receiving information from military intelligence organizations, and cooperates on field activities. The Executive Director is in charge of the day to day operation of the CIA. Each branch of the military service has its own Director. The Associate Director of military affairs, a senior military officer, manages the relationship between the CIA and the Unified Combatant Commands, who produce and deliver to the CIA regional/operational intelligence and consume national intelligence produced by the CIA.

Directorate of Analysis

Aerial view of the Central Intelligence Agency headquarters, Langley, Virginia.

The Directorate of Analysis, through much of its history known as the Directorate of Intelligence (DI), is tasked with helping "the President and other policymakers make informed decisions about our country’s national security" by looking "at all the available information on an issue and organiz[ing] it for policymakers". The Directorate has four regional analytic groups, six groups for transnational issues, and three that focus on policy, collection, and staff support. There is an office dedicated to Iraq; regional analytical offices covering the Near East and South Asia, Russia and Europe; and the Asian Pacific, Latin American, and African office.

Directorate of Operations

Main article: National Clandestine Service

The Directorate of Operations is responsible for collecting foreign intelligence (mainly from clandestine HUMINT sources), and for covert action. The name reflects its role as the coordinator of human intelligence activities between other elements of the wider U.S. intelligence community with their own HUMINT operations. This Directorate was created in an attempt to end years of rivalry over influence, philosophy and budget between the United States Department of Defense (DOD) and the CIA. In spite of this, the Department of Defense recently organized its own global clandestine intelligence service, the Defense Clandestine Service (DCS), under the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).

This Directorate is known to be organized by geographic regions and issues, but its precise organization is classified.

Directorate of Science and Technology

Main article: Directorate of Science & Technology

The Directorate of Science & Technology was established to research, create, and manage technical collection disciplines and equipment. Many of its innovations were transferred to other intelligence organizations, or, as they became more overt, to the military services.

For example, the development of the U-2 high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft was done in cooperation with the United States Air Force. The U-2's original mission was clandestine imagery intelligence over denied areas such as the Soviet Union. It was subsequently provided with signals intelligence and measurement and signature intelligence capabilities, and is now operated by the Air Force.

Imagery intelligence collected by the U-2 and reconnaissance satellites was analyzed by a DS&T organization called the National Photointerpretation Center (NPIC), which had analysts from both the CIA and the military services. Subsequently, NPIC was transferred to the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA).

Directorate of Support

Main article: Directorate of Support

The Directorate of Support has organizational and administrative functions to significant units including:

• The Office of Security
• The Office of Communications
• The Office of Information Technology

Training

Further information: CIA University, Sherman Kent School for Intelligence Analysis, Camp Peary, Harvey Point, and Warrenton Training Center

The CIA established its first training facility, the Office of Training and Education, in 1950. Following the end of the Cold War, the CIA's training budget was slashed, which had a negative effect on employee retention. In response, Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet established CIA University in 2002. CIA University holds between 200 and 300 courses each year, training both new hires and experienced intelligence officers, as well as CIA support staff. The facility works in partnership with the National Intelligence University, and includes the Sherman Kent School for Intelligence Analysis, the Directorate of Analysis' component of the university.

For later stage training of student operations officers, there is at least one classified training area at Camp Peary, near Williamsburg, Virginia. Students are selected, and their progress evaluated, in ways derived from the OSS, published as the book Assessment of Men, Selection of Personnel for the Office of Strategic Services. Additional mission training is conducted at Harvey Point, North Carolina.

The primary training facility for the Office of Communications is Warrenton Training Center, located near Warrenton, Virginia. The facility was established in 1951 and has been used by the CIA since at least 1955.

Budget

Main article: United States intelligence budget

Details of the overall United States intelligence budget are classified. Under the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, the Director of Central Intelligence is the only federal government employee who can spend "un-vouchered" government money. The government showed its 1997 budget was 26.6 billion dollars for the fiscal year. The government has disclosed a total figure for all non-military intelligence spending since 2007; the fiscal 2013 figure is $52.6 billion. According to the 2013 mass surveillance disclosures, the CIA's fiscal 2013 budget is $14.7 billion, 28% of the total and almost 50% more than the budget of the National Security Agency. CIA's HUMINT budget is $2.3 billion, the SIGINT budget is $1.7 billion, and spending for security and logistics of CIA missions is $2.5 billion. "Covert action programs", including a variety of activities such as the CIA's drone fleet and anti-Iranian nuclear program activities, accounts for $2.6 billion.

There were numerous previous attempts to obtain general information about the budget. As a result, it was revealed that CIA's annual budget in Fiscal Year 1963 was US $550 million (inflation-adjusted US$ 4.3 billion in 2017), and the overall intelligence budget in FY 1997 was US $26.6 billion (inflation-adjusted US$ 39.7 billion in 2017). There have been accidental disclosures; for instance, Mary Margaret Graham, a former CIA official and deputy director of national intelligence for collection in 2005, said that the annual intelligence budget was $44 billion, and in 1994 Congress accidentally published a budget of $43.4 billion (in 2012 dollars) in 1994 for the non-military National Intelligence Program, including $4.8 billion for the CIA. After the Marshall Plan was approved, appropriating $13.7 billion over five years, 5% of those funds or $685 million were made available to the CIA.

Employees

Polygraphing

Robert Baer, a CNN analyst and former CIA operative, stated that normally a CIA employee undergoes a polygraph examination every three to four years.

Relationship with other intelligence agencies

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The CIA acts as the primary US HUMINT and general analytic agency, under the Director of National Intelligence, who directs or coordinates the 16 member organizations of the United States Intelligence Community. In addition, it obtains information from other U.S. government intelligence agencies, commercial information sources, and foreign intelligence services.

U.S. agencies

CIA employees form part of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) workforce, originally created as a joint office of the CIA and US Air Force to operate the spy satellites of the US military.

The Special Collections Service is a joint CIA and National Security Agency (NSA) office that conducts clandestine electronic surveillance in embassies and hostile territory throughout the world.

Foreign intelligence services

The role and functions of the CIA are roughly equivalent to those of the United Kingdom's Secret Intelligence Service (the SIS or MI6), the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS), the French foreign intelligence service Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (DGSE), the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki, SVR), the Chinese Ministry of State Security (MSS), the Indian Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), the Egyptian General Intelligence Service, and Israel's Mossad. While the preceding agencies both collect and analyze information, some like the U.S. State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research are purely analytical agencies.

The closest links of the U.S. IC to other foreign intelligence agencies are to Anglophone countries: Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. There is a special communications marking that signals that intelligence-related messages can be shared with these four countries. An indication of the United States' close operational cooperation is the creation of a new message distribution label within the main U.S. military communications network. Previously, the marking of NOFORN (i.e., No Foreign Nationals) required the originator to specify which, if any, non-U.S. countries could receive the information. A new handling caveat, USA/AUS/CAN/GBR/NZL Five Eyes, used primarily on intelligence messages, gives an easier way to indicate that the material can be shared with Australia, Canada, United Kingdom, and New Zealand.

The task of the division called "Verbindungsstelle 61" of the German Bundesnachrichtendienst is keeping contact to the CIA office in Wiesbaden. Ireland's Directorate of Military Intelligence liaises with the CIA, although it is not a member of the Five Eyes.

History

The 113 stars on the CIA Memorial Wall in the original CIA headquarters, each representing a CIA officer killed in action

Main article: History of the Central Intelligence Agency

The Central Intelligence Agency was created on July 26, 1947, when Harry S. Truman signed the National Security Act into law. A major impetus for the creation of the CIA was the unforeseen attack on Pearl Harbor. In addition, towards the end of World War II the U.S. government felt the need for a group to coordinate intelligence efforts.

Immediate predecessors

The success of the British Commandos during World War II prompted U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt to authorize the creation of an intelligence service modeled after the British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), and Special Operations Executive. This led to the creation of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). On September 20, 1945, shortly after the end of World War II, Harry S. Truman signed an executive order dissolving the OSS, and by October 1945 its functions had been divided between the Departments of State and War. The division lasted only a few months. The first public mention of the "Central Intelligence Agency" appeared on a command-restructuring proposal presented by Jim Forrestal and Arthur Radford to the U.S. Senate Military Affairs Committee at the end of 1945. Despite opposition from the military establishment, the United States Department of State and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Truman established the National Intelligence Authority in January 1946, which was the direct predecessor of the CIA. Its operational extension was known as the Central Intelligence Group (CIG)

National Security Act

Lawrence Houston, head counsel of the SSU, CIG, and, later CIA, was principal draftsman of the National Security Act of 1947, which dissolved the NIA and the CIG, and established both the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency. In 1949 Houston helped to draft the Central Intelligence Agency Act (Public law 81-110), which authorized the agency to use confidential fiscal and administrative procedures, and exempted it from most limitations on the use of Federal funds. It also exempted the CIA from having to disclose its "organization, functions, officials, titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel employed." It created the program "PL-110" to handle defectors and other "essential aliens" who fell outside normal immigration procedures.

Intelligence vs. action

At the outset of the Korean War the CIA still only had a few thousand employees, a thousand of whom worked in analysis. Intelligence primarily came from the Office of Reports and Estimates, which drew its reports from a daily take of State Department telegrams, military dispatches, and other public documents. The CIA still lacked its own intelligence gathering abilities. On August 21, 1950, shortly after the invasion of South Korea, Truman announced Walter Bedell Smith as the new Director of the CIA to correct what was seen as a grave failure of Intelligence.

The CIA had different demands placed on it by the different bodies overseeing it. Truman wanted a centralized group to organize the information that reached him, the Department of Defense wanted military intelligence and covert action, and the State Department wanted to create global political change favorable to the US. Thus the two areas of responsibility for the CIA were covert action and covert intelligence. One of the main targets for intelligence gathering was the Soviet Union, which had also been a priority of the CIA's predecessors.

United States Air Force general Hoyt Vandenberg, the CIG's second director, created the Office of Special Operations (OSO), as well as the Office of Reports and Estimates (ORE). Initially the OSO was tasked with spying and subversion overseas with a budget of $15 million, the largesse of a small number of patrons in congress. Vandenberg's goals were much like the ones set out by his predecessor; finding out "everything about the Soviet forces in Eastern and Central Europe – their movements, their capabilities, and their intentions."

On June 18, 1948, the National Security Council issued Directive 10/2 calling for covert action against the USSR, and granting the authority to carry out covert operations against "hostile foreign states or groups" that could, if needed, be denied by the U.S. government. To this end, the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) was created inside the new CIA. The OPC was quite unique; Frank Wisner, the head of the OPC, answered not to the CIA Director, but to the secretaries of defense, state, and the NSC, and the OPC's actions were a secret even from the head of the CIA. Most CIA stations had two station chiefs, one working for the OSO, and one working for the OPC.

The early track record of the CIA was poor, with the agency unable to provide sufficient intelligence about the Soviet takeovers of Romania and Czechoslovakia, the Soviet blockade of Berlin, and the Soviet atomic bomb project. In particular, the agency failed to predict the Chinese entry into the Korean War with 300,000 troops. The famous double agent Kim Philby was the British liaison to American Central Intelligence. Through him the CIA coordinated hundreds of airdrops inside the iron curtain, all compromised by Philby. Arlington Hall, the nerve center of CIA cryptanalysis, was compromised by Bill Weisband, a Russian translator and Soviet spy.

However, the CIA was successful in influencing the 1948 Italian election in favor of the Christian Democrats. The $200 million Exchange Stabilization Fund, earmarked for the reconstruction of Europe, was used to pay wealthy Americans of Italian heritage. Cash was then distributed to Catholic Action, the Vatican's political arm, and directly to Italian politicians. This tactic of using its large fund to purchase elections was frequently repeated in the subsequent years.

Korean War

At the beginning of the Korean War, CIA officer Hans Tofte claimed to have turned a thousand North Korean expatriates into a guerrilla force tasked with infiltration, guerrilla warfare, and pilot rescue. In 1952 the CIA sent 1,500 more expatriate agents north. Seoul station chief Albert Haney would openly celebrate the capabilities of those agents, and the information they sent. In September 1952 Haney was replaced by John Limond Hart, a Europe veteran with a vivid memory for bitter experiences of misinformation. Hart was suspicious of the parade of successes reported by Tofte and Haney and launched an investigation which determined that the entirety of the information supplied by the Korean sources was false or misleading. After the war, internal reviews by the CIA would corroborate Hart's findings. The CIA's Seoul station had 200 officers, but not a single speaker of Korean. Hart reported to Washington that Seoul station was hopeless, and could not be salvaged. Loftus Becker, Deputy Director of Intelligence, was sent personally to tell Hart that the CIA had to keep the station open to save face. Becker returned to Washington, pronounced the situation to be "hopeless", and that, after touring the CIA's Far East operations, the CIA's ability to gather intelligence in the far east was "almost negligible". He then resigned. Air Force Colonel James Kallis stated that CIA director Allen Dulles continued to praise the CIA's Korean force, despite knowing that they were under enemy control. When China entered the war in 1950, the CIA attempted a number of subversive operations in the country, all of which failed due to the presence of double agents. Millions of dollars were spent in these efforts. These included a team of young CIA officers airdropped into to China who were ambushed, and CIA funds being used to set up a global heroin empire in Burma's Golden Triangle following a betrayal by another double agent.

1953 Iranian coup d'état

Main article: 1953 Iranian coup d'état

In 1951, Mohammad Mosaddegh, a member of the National Front, was elected Iranian prime-minister. As prime minister, he nationalized the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company which his predecessor had supported. The nationalization of the British-funded Iranian oil industry, including the largest oil refinery in the world, was disastrous for Mossadeq. A British naval embargo closed the British oil facilities, which Iran had no skilled workers to operate. In 1952 Mosaddegh resisted the royal refusal to approve his Minister of War, and resigned in protest. The National Front took to the streets in protest. Fearing a loss of control, the military pulled its troops back five days later, and the Shah gave in to Mosaddegh's demands. Mosaddegh quickly replaced military leaders loyal to the Shah with those loyal to him, giving him personal control over the military. Given six months of emergency powers, Mosaddegh unilaterally passed legislation. When that six months expired, his powers were extended for another year. In 1953 Mossadeq dismissed parliament and assumed dictatorial powers. This power grab triggered the Shah to exercise his constitutional right to dismiss Mosaddegh. Mosaddegh launched a military coup as the Shah fled the country. As was typical of CIA operations, CIA interventions were preceded by radio announcements on July 7, 1953, made by the CIA's intended victim by way of operational leaks. On August 19, a CIA paid mob led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini would spark what a US embassy officer called "an almost spontaneous revolution" but Mosaddegh was protected by his new inner military circle, and the CIA had been unable to gain influence within the Iranian military. Their chosen man, former general Fazlollah Zahedi, had no troops to call on. General McClure, commander of the American military assistance advisory group, would get his second star buying the loyalty of the Iranian officers he was training. An attack on his house would force Mossadegh to flee. He surrendered the next day, and his coup came to an end. The end result would be a 60/40 oil profit split in favor of Iran (possibly similar to agreements with Saudi Arabia and Venezuela).

1954 Guatemalan coup d'état

Main article: 1954 Guatemalan coup d'état

The return of the Shah to power, and the impression, cultivated by Allen Dulles, that an effective CIA had been able to guide that nation to friendly and stable relations with the west triggered planning for Operation PBSUCCESS, a plan to overthrow Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz. The plan was exposed in major newspapers before it happened after a CIA agent left plans for the coup in his Guatemala City hotel room.

The Guatemalan Revolution of 1944–54 overthrew the U.S. backed dictator Jorge Ubico and brought a democratically elected government to power. The government began an ambitious agrarian reform program attempting to grant land to millions of landless peasants. This program threatened the land holdings of the United Fruit Company, who lobbied for a coup by portraying these reforms as communist.

On June 18, 1954, Carlos Castillo Armas led 480 CIA-trained men across the border from Honduras into Guatemala. The weapons had also come from the CIA. The CIA also mounted a psychological campaign to convince the Guatemalan people and government that Armas' victory was a fait accompli, the largest part of which was a radio broadcast entitled "The Voice of Liberation" which announced that Guatemalan exiles led by Castillo Armas were shortly about to liberate the country. On June 25, a CIA plane bombed Guatemala City, destroying the government's main oil reserves. Árbenz ordered the army to distribute weapons to local peasants and workers. The army refused, forcing Jacobo Árbenz's resignation on June 27, 1954. Árbenz handed over power to Colonel Carlos Enrique Diaz. The CIA then orchestrated a series of power transfers that ended with the confirmation of Castillo Armas as president in July 1954. Armas was the first in a series of military dictators that would rule the country, triggering the brutal Guatemalan Civil War in which some 200,000 people were killed, mostly by the U.S.-backed military.

Syria

In 1949, Colonel Adib Shishakli rose to power in Syria in a CIA-backed coup. Four years later, he would be overthrown by the military, Ba'athists, and communists. The CIA and MI6 started funding right wing members of the military, but suffered a large setback in the aftermath of the Suez Crisis. CIA Agent Rocky Stone, who had played a minor role in the Iranian Revolution, was working at the Damascus embassy as a diplomat, but was actually the station chief. Syrian officers on the CIA dole quickly appeared on television stating that they had received money from "corrupt and sinister Americans" "in an attempt to overthrow the legitimate government of Syria." Syrian forces surrounded the embassy and rousted Agent Stone, who confessed and subsequently made history as the first American diplomat expelled from an Arab nation. This strengthened ties between Syria and Egypt, helping establish the United Arab Republic, and poisoning the well for the US for the foreseeable future.

Indonesia

The charismatic leader of Indonesia was President Sukarno. His declaration of neutrality in the Cold War put the suspicions of the CIA on him. After Sukarno hosted Bandung Conference, promoting the Non-Aligned Movement, the Eisenhower White House responded with NSC 5518 authorizing "all feasible covert means" to move Indonesia into the Western sphere.

The US had no clear policy on Indonesia. Ike sent his special assistant for security operations, F. M. Dearborn Jr., to Jakarta. His report that there was great instability, and that the US lacked stable allies, reinforced the domino theory. Indonesia suffered from what he described as "subversion by democracy". The CIA decided to attempt another military coup in Indonesia, where the Indonesian military was trained by the US, had a strong professional relationship with the US military, had a pro-American officer corps that strongly supported their government, and a strong belief in civilian control of the military, instilled partly by its close association with the US military.

On September 25, 1957, Eisenhower ordered the CIA to start a revolution in Indonesia with the goal of regime change. Three days later, Blitz, a Soviet-controlled weekly in India, reported that the US was plotting to overthrow Sukarno. The story was picked up by the media in Indonesia. One of the first parts of the operation was an 11,500 ton US navy ship landing at Sumatra, delivering weapons for as many as 8,000 potential revolutionaries.

The CIA described Agent Al Pope's bombing and strafing of Indonesia in a CIA B-26 to the President as attacks by "dissident planes". Pope's B-26 was shot down over Ambon, Indonesia on May 18, 1958, and he bailed out. When he was captured, the Indonesian military found his personnel records, after action reports, and his membership card for the officer's club at Clark Field. On March 9, Foster Dulles, the Secretary of State, and brother of DCI Allen Dulles, made a public statement calling for a revolt against communist despotism under Sukarno. Three days later, the CIA reported to the White House that the Indonesian Army's actions against CIA-instigated revolution was suppressing communism.

After Indonesia, Eisenhower displayed mistrust of both the CIA and its Director, Allen Dulles. Dulles too displayed mistrust of the CIA itself. Abbot Smith, a CIA analyst who later became chief of the Office of National Estimates, said, "We had constructed for ourselves a picture of the USSR, and whatever happened had to be made to fit into this picture. Intelligence estimators can hardly commit a more abominable sin." Something reflected in the intelligence failure in Indonesia. On December 16, Eisenhower received a report from his intelligence board of consultants that said the agency was "incapable of making objective appraisals of its own intelligence information as well as its own operations."

Congo

In the election of Patrice Lumumba, and his acceptance of Soviet support the CIA saw another possible Cuba. This view swayed the White House. Ike ordered that Lumumba be "eliminated". The CIA delivered a quarter of a million dollars to Joseph Mobutu, their favored Congolese political figure. Mobutu delivered Lumumba to the Belgians, the former colonial masters of Congo, who executed him in short order.

Gary Powers U-2 shootdown

Main article: 1960 U-2 incident

Suspended from the ceiling of the glass enclosed atrium: three models of the U-2, Lockheed A-12, and D-21 drone. These models are exact replicas at one-sixth scale of the real planes. All three had photographic capabilities. The U-2 was one of the first espionage planes developed by the CIA. The A-12 set unheralded flight records. The D-21 drone was one of the first unmanned aircraft ever built. Lockheed Martin Corporation donated all three models to the CIA.

After the Bomber Gap came the Missile Gap. Eisenhower wanted to use the U-2 to disprove the Missile Gap, but he had banned U-2 overflights of the USSR after meeting Secretary Khrushchev at Camp David. Another reason the President objected to the use of the U-2 was that, in the nuclear age, the intelligence he needed most was on their intentions, without which, the US would face a paralysis of intelligence. He was particularly worried that U-2 flights could be seen as preparations for first strike attacks. He had high hopes for an upcoming meeting with Khrushchev in Paris. Eisenhower finally gave into CIA pressure to authorize a 16-day window for flights, which was extended an additional six days because of poor weather. On May 1, 1960, the USSR shot down a U-2 flying over the Soviet territory. To Eisenhower, the ensuing coverup destroyed his perceived honesty, and his hope of leaving a legacy of thawing relations with Khrushchev. It would also mark the beginning of a long downward slide in the credibility of the Office of the President of the United States. Eisenhower later said that the U-2 coverup was the greatest regret of his Presidency.

Dominican Republic

The human rights abuses of Generalissimo Rafael Trujillo had a history of more than three decades, but in August 1960 the United States severed diplomatic relations. The CIA's Special group had decided to arm Dominicans in hopes of an assassination. The CIA had dispersed three rifles, and three .38 revolvers, but things paused as Kennedy assumed office. An order approved by Kennedy resulted in the dispersal of four machine guns. Trujillo died from gunshot wounds two weeks later. In the aftermath, Robert Kennedy wrote that the CIA had succeeded where it had failed many times in the past, but in the face of that success, it was caught flatfooted, having failed to plan what to do next.

Bay of Pigs

Main article: Bay of Pigs invasion

The CIA welcomed Fidel Castro on his visit to DC, and gave him a face-to-face briefing. The CIA hoped that Castro would bring about a friendly democratic government, and planned to curry his favor with money and guns. On December 11, 1959, a memo reached the DCI's desk recommending Castro's "elimination". Dulles replaced the word "elimination" with "removal", and set the wheels in motion. By mid-August 1960, Dick Bissell would seek, with the blessing of the CIA, to hire the Mafia to assassinate Castro.

The Bay of Pigs Invasion was a failed military invasion of Cuba undertaken by the CIA-sponsored paramilitary group Brigade 2506 on April 17, 1961. A counter-revolutionary military, trained and funded by the CIA, Brigade 2506 fronted the armed wing of the Democratic Revolutionary Front (DRF) and intended to overthrow the increasingly communist government of Fidel Castro. Launched from Guatemala, the invading force was defeated within three days by the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces, under the direct command of Prime Minister Fidel Castro. US President Dwight D. Eisenhower was concerned at the direction Castro's government was taking, and in March 1960, Eisenhower allocated $13.1 million to the CIA to plan Castro's overthrow. The CIA proceeded to organize the operation with the aid of various Cuban counter-revolutionary forces, training Brigade 2506 in Guatemala. Over 1,400 paramilitaries set out for Cuba by boat on April 13. Two days later on April 15, eight CIA-supplied B-26 bombers attacked Cuban air fields. On the night of April 16, the main invasion landed in the Bay of Pigs, but by April 20, the invaders finally surrendered. The failed invasion strengthened the position of Castro's leadership as well as his ties with the USSR. This led eventually to the events of the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. The invasion was a major embarrassment for US foreign policy. US President John F. Kennedy ordered a number of internal investigations across Latin America.

The Taylor Board was commissioned to determine what went wrong in Cuba. The Board came to the same conclusion that the Jan '61 President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities had concluded, and many other reviews prior, and to come, that Covert Action had to be completely isolated from intelligence and analysis. The Inspector General of the CIA investigated the Bay of Pigs. His conclusion was that there was a need to drastically improve the organization and management of the CIA. The Special Group (Later renamed the 303 committee) was convened in an oversight role.

Early Cold War, 1953–1966

Lockheed U-2 "Dragon Lady", the first generation of near-space reconnaissance aircraft

Early CORONA/KH-4B imagery IMINT satellite

The USAF's SR-71 Blackbird was developed from the CIA's A-12 OXCART.

The CIA was involved in anti-Communist activities in Burma, Guatemala, and Laos. There have been suggestions that the Soviet attempt to put missiles into Cuba came, indirectly, when they realized how badly they had been compromised by a U.S.-UK defector in place, Oleg Penkovsky. One of the biggest operations ever undertaken by the CIA was directed at Zaïre in support of general-turned-dictator Mobutu Sese Seko.

Indochina, Tibet and the Vietnam War (1954–1975)

See also: CIA Tibetan program, Vietnam War, Phoenix Program, Operation Barrel Roll, and Laotian Civil War

The OSS Patti mission arrived in Vietnam near the end of World War II, and had significant interaction with the leaders of many Vietnamese factions, including Ho Chi Minh.

The CIA Tibetan program consists of political plots, propaganda distribution, as well as paramilitary and intelligence gathering based on U.S. commitments made to the Dalai Lama in 1951 and 1956.

During the period of U.S. combat involvement in the Vietnam War, there was considerable argument about progress among the Department of Defense under Robert McNamara, the CIA, and, to some extent, the intelligence staff of Military Assistance Command Vietnam.

Sometime between 1959 and 1961 the CIA started Project Tiger, a program of dropping South Vietnamese agents into North Vietnam to gather intelligence. These were failures; the Deputy Chief for Project Tiger, Captain Do Van Tien, admitted that he was an agent for Hanoi.

Johnson

In the face of the failure of Project Tiger, the Pentagon wanted CIA paramilitary forces to participate in their Op Plan 64A, this resulted in the CIA's foreign paramilitaries being put under the command of the DOD, a move seen as a slippery slope inside the CIA, a slide from covert action towards militarization.

A CIA analyst's assessment of Vietnam was that the US was "becoming progressively divorced from reality... [and] proceeding with far more courage than wisdom".

Nixon

In 1971, the NSA and CIA were engaged in domestic spying. The DOD was eavesdropping on Kissinger. The White House, and Camp David were wired for sound. Nixon and Kissinger were eavesdropping on their aides, as well as reporters. Famously, Nixon's Plumbers had in their number many former CIA agents, including Howard Hunt, Jim McCord, and Eugenio Martinez. On July 7, 1971, John Ehrlichman, Nixon's domestic policy chief, told DCI Cushman, Nixon's hatchet-man in the CIA, to let Cushman "know that [Hunt] was in fact doing some things for the President... you should consider he has pretty much carte blanche" Importantly, this included a camera, disguises, a voice altering device, and ID papers furnished by the CIA, as well as the CIA's participation developing film from the burglary Hunt staged on the office of Pentagon Papers leaker Daniel Ellsberg's psychologist.

On June 17, Nixon's Plumbers were caught burglarizing the DNC offices in the Watergate. On June 23, DCI Helms was ordered by the White House to wave the FBI off using national security as a pretext. The new DCI, Walters, another Nixon hack, called the acting director of the FBI and told him to drop the investigation as ordered. On June 26, Nixon's counsel John Dean ordered DCI Walters to pay the plumbers untraceable hush money. The CIA was the only part of the government that had the power to make off the book payments, but it could only be done on the orders of the CI, or, if he was out of the country, the DCI. The Acting Director of the FBI started breaking ranks. He demanded the CIA produce a signed document attesting to the national security threat of the investigation. Jim McCord's lawyer contacted the CIA informing them that McCord had been offered a Presidential pardon if he fingered the CIA, testifying that the break-in had been an operation of the CIA. Nixon had long been frustrated by what he saw as a liberal infection inside the CIA, and had been trying for years to tear the CIA out by its roots. McCord wrote "If [DCI] Helms goes (takes the fall) and the Watergate operation is laid at the CIA's feet, where it does not belong, every tree in the forest will fall. It will be a scorched desert."

On November 13, after Nixon's landslide re-election, Nixon told Kissinger "[I intend] to ruin the Foreign Service. I mean ruin it – the old Foreign Service – and to build a new one." He had similar designs for the CIA, and intended to replace Helms with James Schlesinger. Nixon had told Helms that he was on the way out, and promised that Helms could stay on until his 60th birthday, the mandatory retirement age. On February 2, Nixon broke that promise, carrying through with his intention to "remove the deadwood" from the CIA. "Get rid of the clowns" was his order to the incoming CI. Kissinger had been running the CIA since the beginning of Nixon's presidency, but Nixon impressed on Schlesinger that he must appear to congress to be in charge, averting their suspicion of Kissinger's involvement. Nixon also hoped that Schlesinger could push through broader changes in the intelligence community that he had been working towards for years, the creation of a Director of National Intelligence, and spinning off the covert action part of the CIA into a separate organ. Before Helms would leave office, he would destroy every tape he had secretly made of meetings in his office, and many of the papers on Project MKUltra. In Schlesinger's 17-week tenure, he would fire more than 1,500 employees. As Watergate threw the spotlight on the CIA, Schlesinger, who had been kept in the dark about the CIA's involvement, decided he needed to know what skeletons were in the closet. He issued a memo to every CIA employee directing them to disclose to him any CIA activity they knew of past or present that could fall outside the scope of the CIA's charter.

This became the Family Jewels. It included information linking the CIA to the assassination of foreign leaders, the illegal surveillance of some 7,000 U.S. citizens involved in the antiwar movement (Operation CHAOS), the CIA had also experimented on U.S. and Canadian citizens without their knowledge, secretly giving them LSD (among other things) and observing the results. This prompted Congress to create the Church Committee in the Senate, and the Pike Committee in the House. President Gerald Ford created the Rockefeller Commission, and issued an executive order prohibiting the assassination of foreign leaders. DCI Colby leaked the papers to the press, later he stated that he believed that providing Congress with this information was the correct thing to do, and ultimately in the CIA's own interests.

Congressional Investigations

Acting Attorney General Laurence Silberman learned of the existence of the Family Jewels, he issued a subpoena for them, prompting eight congressional investigations on the domestic spying activities of the CIA. Bill Colby's short tenure as DCI would end with the Halloween Massacre. His replacement was George H.W. Bush. At the time, the DOD had control of 80% of the intelligence budget. Communication and coordination between the CIA and the DOD would suffer greatly under Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. The CIA's budget for hiring clandestine officers had been squeezed out by the paramilitary operations in south-east Asia, and hiring was further strained by the government's poor popularity. This left the Agency bloated with middle management, and anemic in younger officers. With employee training taking five years, the Agency's only hope would be on the trickle of new officers coming to fruition years in the future. The CIA would see another setback as communists would take Angola. William J. Casey, a member of Ford's Intelligence Advisory Board, would press Bush to allow a team from outside the CIA to produce Soviet military estimates as a "Team B". Bush gave the OK. The "B" team was composed of hawks. Their estimates were the highest that could be justified, and they painted a picture of a growing Soviet military when the Soviet military was actually shrinking. Many of their reports found their way to the press. As a result of the investigations, Congressional oversight of the CIA eventually evolved into a select intelligence committee in the House, and Senate supervising covert actions authorized by the President.

Chad

Chad's neighbor Libya was a major source of weaponry to communist rebel forces. The CIA seized the opportunity to arm and finance Chad's Prime Minister, Hissène Habré after he created a breakaway government in Western Sudan, even giving him Stinger missiles.

Afghanistan

See also: CIA activities in Afghanistan and Operation Cyclone

Further information: Allegations of CIA assistance to Osama bin Laden

In Afghanistan, the CIA funneled $40 billion worth of weapons, which included over two thousand FIM-92 Stinger surface-to-air missiles, to Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), which funneled them to almost 100,000 Afghan resistance fighters, notably the Mujahideen, and foreign "Afghan Arabs" from forty Muslim countries.

Iran/Contra

Under President Jimmy Carter, the CIA was conducting covertly funded pro-American opposition against the Sandinista. In March 1981, Reagan told Congress that the CIA would protect El Salvador by preventing the shipment of Nicaraguan arms into the country to arm Communist rebels. This was a ruse. The CIA was actually arming and training Nicaraguans Contras in Honduras in hopes that they could depose the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. Through William J. Casey's tenure as DCI little of what he said in the National Security Planning Group, or to President Reagan was supported by the intelligence branch of the CIA, so Casey formed the Central American Task Force, staffed with yes men from Covert Action. On December 21, 1982, Congress passed a law restricting the CIA to its stated mission, restricting the flow of arms from Nicaragua to El Salvador, prohibiting the use of funds to oust the Sandinistas. Reagan testified before Congress, assuring them that the CIA was not trying to topple the Nicaraguan government.

Lebanon

The CIA's prime source in Lebanon was Bashir Gemayel, a member of the Christian Maronite sect. The CIA was blinded by the uprising against the Maronite minority. Israel invaded Lebanon, and, along with the CIA, propped up Gemayel. This got Gemayel's assurance that Americans would be protected in Lebanon. 13 days later he was assassinated. Imad Mughniyah, a Hezbollah assassin would target Americans in retaliation for the Israeli invasion, the Sabra and Shatila massacre, and the US Marines of the Multi-National Force for their role in opposing the PLO in Lebanon. On April 18, 1983, a 2,000 lb car bomb exploded in the lobby of the American embassy in Beirut, killing 63 people including 17 Americans, and 7 CIA officers, including Robert Ames, one of the CIA's best Middle East experts. America's fortunes in Lebanon would only suffer more as America's poorly-directed retaliation for the bombing was interpreted by many as support for the Christian Maronite minority. On October 23, 1983, two bombs (1983 Beirut Bombing) were set off in Beirut, including a 10 ton bomb at a US military barracks that killed 242 people. Both attacks are believed to have been planned by Iran by way of Mughniyah.

The Embassy bombing had taken the life of the CIA's Beirut Station Chief, Ken Haas. Bill Buckley was sent in to replace him. Eighteen days after the US Marines left Lebanon, Buckley was kidnapped. On March 7, 1984, Jeremy Levin, CNN Bureau Chief in Beirut was kidnapped. Twelve more Americans would be kidnapped in Beirut during the Reagan Administration. Manucher Ghorbanifar, a former Savak agent was an information seller, and the subject of a rare CIA burn notice for his track record of misinformation. He reached out to the Agency offering a back channel to Iran, suggesting a trade of missiles that would be lucrative to the intermediaries.

Poland 1980–89

See also: Poland–United States relations

Unlike the Carter Administration, the Reagan Administration supported the Solidarity movement in Poland, and—based on CIA intelligence—waged a public relations campaign to deter what the Carter administration felt was "an imminent move by large Soviet military forces into Poland." Colonel Ryszard Kukliński, a senior officer on the Polish General Staff was secretly sending reports to the CIA. The CIA transferred around $2 million yearly in cash to Solidarity, which suggests that $10 million total is a reasonable estimate for the five-year total. There were no direct links between the CIA and Solidarnosc, and all money was channeled through third parties. CIA officers were barred from meeting Solidarity leaders, and the CIA's contacts with Solidarnosc activists were weaker than those of the AFL-CIO, which raised 300 thousand dollars from its members, which were used to provide material and cash directly to Soldarity, with no control of Solidarity's use of it. The U.S. Congress authorized the National Endowment for Democracy to promote democracy, and the NED allocated $10 million to Solidarity. When the Polish government launched a crackdown of its own in December 1981, however, Solidarity was not alerted. Potential explanations for this vary; some believe that the CIA was caught off guard, while others suggest that American policy-makers viewed an internal crackdown as preferable to an "inevitable Soviet intervention." CIA support for Solidarity included money, equipment and training, which was coordinated by Special Operations CIA division. Henry Hyde, U.S. House intelligence committee member, stated that USA provided "supplies and technical assistance in terms of clandestine newspapers, broadcasting, propaganda, money, organizational help and advice". Michael Reisman from Yale Law School named operations in Poland as one of the covert actions of CIA during Cold War. Initial funds for covert actions by CIA were $2 million, but soon after authorization were increased and by 1985 CIA successfully infiltrated Poland Rainer Thiel in Nested Games of External Democracy Promotion: The United States and the Polish Liberalization 1980–1989 mentions how covert operations by CIA and spy games among others allowed USA to proceed with successful regime change.

Operation Desert Storm

Main article: Gulf War

During the Iran-Iraq war, the CIA had backed both sides. The CIA had maintained a network of spies in Iran, but in 1989 a CIA mistake compromised every agent they had in there, and the CIA had no agents in Iraq. In the weeks before the Invasion of Kuwait the CIA downplayed the military buildup. During the war CIA estimates of Iraqi abilities and intentions flip-flopped and were rarely accurate. In one particular case, the DOD had asked the CIA to identify military targets to bomb. One target the CIA identified was an underground shelter. The CIA didn't know that it was a civilian bomb shelter. In a rare instance the CIA correctly determined that the coalition forces efforts were coming up short in their efforts to destroy SCUD missiles. Congress took away the CIA's role in interpreting spy-satellite photos, putting the CIA's satellite intelligence operations under the auspices of the military. The CIA created its office of military affairs, which operated as "second-echelon support for the pentagon... answering... questions from military men [like] 'how wide is this road?'"

Fall of the USSR

Gorbachev's announcement of the unilateral reduction of 500,000 Soviet troops took the CIA by surprise. Moreover, Doug MacEachin, the CIA's Chief of Soviet analysis said that even if the CIA had told the President, the NSC, and Congress about the cuts beforehand, it would have been ignored. "We never would have been able to publish it." All the CIA numbers on the USSR's economy were wrong. Too often the CIA relied on people inexperienced with that which they were supposed to be the expert on. Bob Gates had preceded Doug MacEachin as Chief of Soviet analysis, and he had never visited Russia. Few officers, even those stationed in country spoke the language of the people they were spying on. And the CIA had no capacity to send agents to respond to developing situations. The CIA analysis of Russia during the entire cold war was either driven by ideology, or by politics. William J. Crowe, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, noted that the CIA "talked about the Soviet Union as if they weren't reading the newspapers, much less developed clandestine intelligence."

President Clinton

On January 25, 1993, Mir Qazi opened fire at the CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia, killing two agents and wounding three others. On February 26, Al-Qaeda terrorists led by Ramzi Yousef bombed the parking garage below the North Tower of the World Trade Center in New York City, killing six people and injuring 1,402 others.

During the Bosnian War, the CIA ignored signs within and without of the Srebrenica massacre. Two weeks after news reports of the slaughter, the CIA sent a U-2 to photograph it; a week later the CIA completed its report on the matter. During Operation Allied Force, the CIA had incorrectly provided the coordinates of the Chinese Embassy as a Yugoslav military target resulting in its bombing.

In France, the CIA had orders for economic intelligence; a female CIA agent revealed her connections to the CIA to the French. Dick Holm, Paris Station Chief, was expelled. In Guatemala, the CIA produced the Murphy Memo, based on audio recordings made by bugs planted by Guatemalan intelligence in the bedroom of Ambassador Marilyn McAfee. In the recording, Ambassador McAfee verbally entreated "Murphy". The CIA circulated a memo in the highest Washington circles accusing Ambassador McAfee of having an extramarital lesbian affair with her secretary, Carol Murphy. There was no affair. Ambassador McAfee was calling to Murphy, her poodle.

Harold James Nicholson would burn several serving officers and three years of trainees before he was caught spying for Russia. In 1997 the House would pen another report, which said that CIA officers know little about the language or politics of the people they spy on; the conclusion was that the CIA lacked the "depth, breadth, and expertise to monitor political, military, and economic developments worldwide." Russ Travers said in the CIA in-house journal that in five years "intelligence failure is inevitable". In 1997 the CIA's new director George Tenet would promise a new working agency by 2002. The CIA's surprise at India's detonation of an atom bomb was a failure at almost every level. After the 1998 embassy bombings by Al Qaeda, the CIA offered two targets to be hit in retaliation. One of them was the Al-Shifa pharmaceutical factory, where traces of chemical weapon precursors had been detected. In the aftermath it was concluded that "the decision to target al Shifa continues a tradition of operating on inadequate intelligence about Sudan." It triggered the CIA to make "substantial and sweeping changes" to prevent "a catastrophic systemic intelligence failure." Between 1991 and 1998 the CIA lost 3,000 employees.

Aldrich Ames

See also: Aldrich Ames

Between 1985 and 1986 the CIA lost every spy it had in Eastern Europe. The details of the investigation into the cause were obscured from the new Director, and the investigation had little success, and has been widely criticized. In June 1987, Major Florentino Aspillaga Lombard, the chief of Cuban Intelligence in Czechoslovakia drove into Vienna, and walked into the American Embassy to defect. He revealed that every single Cuban spy on the CIA payroll was a double agent, pretending to work for the CIA, but secretly still being loyal to Castro. On February 21, 1994, FBI agents pulled Aldrich Ames out of his Jaguar. In the investigation that ensued, the CIA discovered that many of the sources for its most important analyses of the USSR were based on Soviet disinformation fed to the CIA by controlled agents. On top of that, it was discovered that, in some cases, the CIA suspected at the time that the sources were compromised, but the information was sent up the chain as genuine.

Osama Bin Laden

Agency files show that it is believed Osama Bin Laden was funding the Afghan rebels against the USSR in the 1980s. In 1991, Bin Laden returned to his native Saudi Arabia protesting the presence of troops, and Operation Desert Storm. He was expelled from the country. In 1996 the CIA created a team to hunt Bin Laden. They were trading information with the Sudanese until, on the word of a source that would later be found to be a fabricator, the CIA closed its Sudan station later that year. In 1998 Bin Laden would declare war on America, and, on August 7, strike in Tanzania and Nairobi. On October 12, 2000, Al Qaeda bombed the USS Cole. In 1947 when the CIA was founded, there were 200 agents in the Clandestine Service. In 2001, of the 17,000 employees in the CIA, there were 1,000 in the Clandestine Service. Of that 1,000 few would accept hardship postings. In the first days of George W. Bush's presidency, Al Qaeda threats were ubiquitous in daily Presidential CIA briefings, but it may have become a case of the boy who cries wolf. The Agency's predictions were dire, but carried little weight, and the attentions of the President and his defense staff were elsewhere. The CIA arranged the arrests of suspected Al Qaeda members through cooperation with foreign agencies, but the CIA could not definitively say what effect these arrests had had, and it could not gain hard intelligence from those captured. The President had asked the CIA if Al Qaeda could plan attacks in the US. On August 6, Bush received a daily briefing with the headline, not based on current, solid intelligence, "Al Qaeda determined to strike inside the US." The US had been hunting Bin Laden since 1996 and had had several opportunities, but neither Clinton, nor Bush had wanted to risk their skin taking an active role in a murky assassination plot, and the perfect opportunity had never materialized for a trigger shy DCI that would have given him the reassurances he needed to take the plunge. That day, Richard A. Clarke sent National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice warning of the risks, and decrying the inaction of the CIA.

Al-Qaeda and the "Global War on Terrorism"

Further information: CIA transnational anti-terrorism activities, Human rights violations by the CIA, and Senate Intelligence Committee report on CIA torture

The CIA prepared a series of leaflets announcing bounties for those who turned in or denounced individual suspected of association with the Taliban or al Qaeda.

The CIA had long been dealing with terrorism originating from abroad, and in 1986 had set up a Counterterrorist Center to deal specifically with the problem. At first confronted with secular terrorism, the Agency found Islamist terrorism looming increasingly large on its scope.

In January 1996, the CIA created an experimental "virtual station," the Bin Laden Issue Station, under the Counterterrorist Center, to track Bin Laden's developing activities. Al-Fadl, who defected to the CIA in spring 1996, began to provide the Station with a new image of the Al Qaeda leader: he was not only a terrorist financier, but a terrorist organizer, too. FBI Special Agent Dan Coleman (who together with his partner Jack Cloonan had been "seconded" to the Bin Laden Station) called him Qaeda's "Rosetta Stone".

In 1999, CIA chief George Tenet launched a grand "Plan" to deal with al-Qaeda. The Counterterrorist Center, its new chief Cofer Black and the center's Bin Laden unit were the Plan's developers and executors. Once it was prepared Tenet assigned CIA intelligence chief Charles E. Allen to set up a "Qaeda cell" to oversee its tactical execution. In 2000, the CIA and USAF jointly ran a series of flights over Afghanistan with a small remote-controlled reconnaissance drone, the Predator; they obtained probable photos of Bin Laden. Cofer Black and others became advocates of arming the Predator with missiles to try to assassinate Bin Laden and other al-Qaeda leaders. After the Cabinet-level Principals Committee meeting on terrorism of September 4, 2001, the CIA resumed reconnaissance flights, the drones now being weapons-capable.

September 11 attacks and its aftermath

US Special Forces help Northern Alliance troops away from a CIA-operated MI-17 Hip helicopter at Bagram Airbase, 2002

On September 11, 2001, 19 Al-Qaeda members hijacked four passenger jets within the Northeastern United States in a series of coordinated terrorist attacks. Two planes crashed into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City, the third into the Pentagon in Arlington County, Virginia, and the fourth inadvertently into a field near Shanksville, Pennsylvania. The attacks cost the lives of 2,996 people (including the 19 hijackers), caused the destruction of the Twin Towers, and damaged the western side of the Pentagon. Soon after 9/11, The New York Times released a story stating that the CIA's New York field office was destroyed in the wake of the attacks. According to unnamed CIA sources, while first responders, military personnel and volunteers were conducting rescue efforts at the World Trade Center site, a special CIA team was searching the rubble for both digital and paper copies of classified documents. This was done according to well-rehearsed document recovery procedures put in place after the Iranian takeover of the United States Embassy in Tehran in 1979. While it was not confirmed whether the agency was able to retrieve the classified information, it is known that all agents present that day fled the building safely.

While the CIA insists that those who conducted the attacks on 9/11 were not aware that the agency was operating at 7 World Trade Center under the guise of another (unidentified) federal agency, this center was the headquarters for many notable criminal terrorism investigations. Though the New York field offices' main responsibilities were to monitor and recruit foreign officials stationed at the United Nations, the field office also handled the investigations of the August 1998 bombings of United States Embassies in East Africa and the October 2000 bombing of the USS Cole. Despite the fact that the CIA's New York branch may have been damaged by the 9/11 attacks and they had to loan office space from the US Mission to the United Nations and other federal agencies, there was an upside for the CIA. In the months immediately following 9/11, there was a huge increase in the number of applications for CIA positions. According to CIA representatives that spoke with The New York Times, pre-9/11 the agency received approximately 500 to 600 applications a week, in the months following 9/11 the agency received that number daily.

The intelligence community as a whole, and especially the CIA, were involved in presidential planning immediately after the 9/11 attacks. In his address to the nation at 8:30pm on September 11, 2001, George W. Bush mentioned the intelligence community: "The search is underway for those who are behind these evil acts, I've directed the full resource of our intelligence and law enforcement communities to find those responsible and bring them to justice."

The involvement of the CIA in the newly coined "War on Terror" was further increased on September 15, 2001. During a meeting at Camp David George W. Bush agreed to adopt a plan proposed by CIA director George Tenet. This plan consisted of conducting a covert war in which CIA paramilitary officers would cooperate with anti-Taliban guerillas inside Afghanistan. They would later be joined by small special operations forces teams which would call in precision airstrikes on Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters. This plan was codified on September 16, 2001 with Bush's signature of an official Memorandum of Notification that allowed the plan to proceed.

Former CIA director Robert Gates meets with Russian Minister of Defense and ex-KGB officer Sergei Ivanov, 2007

On November 25–27, 2001, Taliban prisoners revolted at the Qala Jangi prison west of Mazar-e-Sharif. Though several days of struggle occurred between the Taliban prisoners and the Northern Alliance members present, the prisoners did gain the upper hand and obtain North Alliance weapons. At some point during this period Johnny "Mike" Spann, a CIA officer sent to question the prisoners, was beaten to death. He became the first American to die in combat in the war in Afghanistan.

After 9/11, the CIA came under criticism for not having done enough to prevent the attacks. Tenet rejected the criticism, citing the Agency's planning efforts especially over the preceding two years. He also considered that the CIA's efforts had put the Agency in a position to respond rapidly and effectively to the attacks, both in the "Afghan sanctuary" and in "ninety-two countries around the world". The new strategy was called the "Worldwide Attack Matrix".

Anwar al-Awlaki, a Yemeni-American U.S. citizen and al-Qaeda member, was killed on September 30, 2011, by an air attack carried out by the Joint Special Operations Command. After several days of surveillance of Awlaki by the Central Intelligence Agency, armed drones took off from a new, secret American base in the Arabian Peninsula, crossed into northern Yemen, and fired a number of Hellfire missiles at al-Awlaki's vehicle. Samir Khan, a Pakistani-American al-Qaeda member and editor of the jihadist Inspire magazine, also reportedly died in the attack. The combined CIA/JSOC drone strike was the first in Yemen since 2002 – there have been others by the military's Special Operations forces – and was part of an effort by the spy agency to duplicate in Yemen the covert war which has been running in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Use of vaccination programs

The agency attracted widespread criticism after it used a doctor in Pakistan to set up a vaccination program in Abbottabad in 2011 to obtain DNA samples from the occupants of a compound where it was suspected bin Laden was living.

Failures in intelligence analysis

A major criticism is failure to forestall the September 11 attacks. The 9/11 Commission Report identifies failures in the IC as a whole. One problem, for example, was the FBI failing to "connect the dots" by sharing information among its decentralized field offices.

The report concluded that former DCI George Tenet failed to adequately prepare the agency to deal with the danger posed by al-Qaeda prior to the attacks of September 11, 2001. The report was finished in June 2005 and was partially released to the public in an agreement with Congress, over the objections of current DCI General Michael Hayden. Hayden said its publication would "consume time and attention revisiting ground that is already well plowed." Tenet disagreed with the report's conclusions, citing his planning efforts vis-à-vis al-Qaeda, particularly from 1999.

Abuses of CIA authority, 1970s–1990s

Conditions worsened in the mid-1970s, around the time of Watergate. A dominant feature of political life during that period were the attempts of Congress to assert oversight of the U.S. Presidency and the executive branch of the U.S. government. Revelations about past CIA activities, such as assassinations and attempted assassinations of foreign leaders (most notably Fidel Castro and Rafael Trujillo) and illegal domestic spying on U.S. citizens, provided the opportunities to increase Congressional oversight of U.S. intelligence operations. CIA involvement in Contra cocaine trafficking in Nicaragua and complicity in the actions of the death squads in El Salvador and Honduras also came to light.

Nixon Oval Office meeting with H.R. Haldeman "Smoking Gun" Conversation June 23, 1972. (Full transcript).

Hastening the CIA's fall from grace were the burglary of the Watergate headquarters of the Democratic Party by former CIA officers, and President Richard Nixon's subsequent attempt to use the CIA to impede the FBI's investigation of the burglary. In the famous "smoking gun" recording that led to President Nixon's resignation, Nixon ordered his chief of staff, H. R. Haldeman, to tell the CIA that further investigation of Watergate would "open the whole can of worms" about the Bay of Pigs Invasion of Cuba. In this way Nixon and Haldemann ensured that the CIA's No. 1 and No. 2 ranking officials, Richard Helms and Vernon Walters, communicated to FBI Director L. Patrick Gray that the FBI should not follow the money trail from the burglars to the Committee to Re-elect the President, as it would uncover CIA informants in Mexico. The FBI initially agreed to this due to a long-standing agreement between the FBI and CIA not to uncover each other's sources of information, though within a couple of weeks the FBI demanded this request in writing, and when no such formal request came, the FBI resumed its investigation into the money trail. Nonetheless, when the smoking gun tapes were made public, damage to the public's perception of CIA's top officials, and thus to the CIA as a whole, could not be avoided.

President Gerald Ford meets with CIA Director-designate George H. W. Bush, December 17, 1975

Repercussions from the Iran-Contra affair arms smuggling scandal included the creation of the Intelligence Authorization Act in 1991. It defined covert operations as secret missions in geopolitical areas where the U.S. is neither openly nor apparently engaged. This also required an authorizing chain of command, including an official, presidential finding report and the informing of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees, which, in emergencies, requires only "timely notification."

Iraq War

Main article: CIA activities in Iraq

Further information: Plame affair

72 days after the 9/11 attacks President Bush told his Secretary of Defense to update the US plan for an invasion of Iraq, but not to tell anyone. SecDef Rumsfeld asked Bush if he could bring DCI Tenet into the loop, to which Bush agreed.

Feelers the CIA had put out to Iraq in the form of eight of their best officers in Kurdish territory in Northern Iraq hit a goldmine, unprecedented in the famously closed, almost fascist Hussein government. By December 2002 the CIA had close to a dozen good networks in Iraq and would advance so far that they would penetrate Iraq's SSO, and even tap the encrypted communications of the Deputy Prime Minister, even the bodyguard of Hussein's son became an agent. As time passed, the CIA would become more and more frantic about the possibility of their networks being compromised, "rolled up". To the CIA, the Invasion had to occur before the end of February 2003 if their sources inside Hussein's government were to survive. The rollup would happen as predicted, 37 CIA sources recognized by their Thuraya satellite telephones provided for them by the CIA.

Former CIA deputy director Michael Morell (left) apologized to Colin Powell for the CIA's erroneous assessments of Iraq's WMD programs.

The case Colin Powell presented before the United Nations (purportedly proving an Iraqi WMD program) was wishful thinking. DDCI John E. McLaughlin was part of a long discussion in the CIA about equivocation. McLaughlin, who would make, among others, the "slam dunk" presentation to the President, "felt that they had to dare to be wrong to be clearer in their judgements". The Al Qaeda connection, for instance, was from a single source, extracted through torture, and was later denied. Curveball was a known liar, and the sole source for the mobile chemical weapons factories. A postmortem of the intelligence failures in the lead up to Iraq led by former DDCI Richard Kerr would conclude that the CIA had been a casualty of the cold war, wiped out in a way "analogous to the effect of the meteor strikes on the dinosaurs."

The opening days of the Invasion of Iraq would see successes and defeats for the CIA. With its Iraq networks compromised, and its strategic and tactical information shallow, and often wrong, the intelligence side of the invasion itself would be a black eye for the Agency. The CIA would see some success with its "Scorpion" paramilitary teams composed of CIA Special Activities Division agents, along with friendly Iraqi partisans. CIA SAD officers would also help the US 10th Special Forces. The occupation of Iraq would be a low point in the history of the CIA. At the largest CIA station in the world agents would rotate through 1–3 month tours. In Iraq almost 500 transient agents would be trapped inside the Green Zone while Iraq Station Chiefs would rotate with only a little less frequency.

2004, DNI takes over CIA top-level functions

The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 created the office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), who took over some of the government and intelligence community (IC)-wide functions that had previously been the CIA's. The DNI manages the United States Intelligence Community and in so doing it manages the intelligence cycle. Among the functions that moved to the DNI were the preparation of estimates reflecting the consolidated opinion of the 16 IC agencies, and preparation of briefings for the president. On July 30, 2008, President Bush issued Executive Order 13470 amending Executive Order 12333 to strengthen the role of the DNI.

Previously, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) oversaw the Intelligence Community, serving as the president's principal intelligence advisor, additionally serving as head of the CIA. The DCI's title now is "Director of the Central Intelligence Agency" (D/CIA), serving as head of the CIA.

Currently, the CIA reports to the Director of National Intelligence. Prior to the establishment of the DNI, the CIA reported to the President, with informational briefings to congressional committees. The National Security Advisor is a permanent member of the National Security Council, responsible for briefing the President with pertinent information collected by all U.S. intelligence agencies, including the National Security Agency, the Drug Enforcement Administration, etc. All 16 Intelligence Community agencies are under the authority of the Director of National Intelligence.

Operation Neptune Spear

See also: Death of Osama bin Laden

On May 1, 2011, President Barack Obama announced that Osama bin Laden was killed earlier that day by "a small team of Americans" operating in Abbottabad, Pakistan, during a CIA operation. The raid was executed from a CIA forward base in Afghanistan by elements of the U.S. Navy's Naval Special Warfare Development Group and CIA paramilitary operatives.

It resulted in the acquisition of extensive intelligence on the future attack plans of al-Qaeda.

The operation was a result of years of intelligence work that included the CIA's capture and interrogation of Khalid Sheik Mohammad (KSM), which led to the identity of a courier of Bin Laden's, the tracking of the courier to the compound by Special Activities Division paramilitary operatives and the establishing of a CIA safe house to provide critical tactical intelligence for the operation.

Syrian Civil War

Main article: CIA activities in Syria

Under the aegis of operation Timber Sycamore and other clandestine activities, CIA operatives and U.S. special operations troops have trained and armed nearly 10,000 rebel fighters at a cost of $1 billion a year. The CIA has been sending weapons to anti-government rebels in Syria since at least 2012. These weapons have been reportedly falling into hands of extremists, such as al-Nusra Front and ISIL. Around February 2017, the CIA was instructed to halt military aid to Syrian rebels (Free Syrian Army or FSA), which also included training, ammunition, guided missiles, and salaries. Sources state that the hold on aid was not related to the transitions from Obama's administration to Trump's, but rather due to issues faced by the FSA. Based on responses by rebel officials, they believe that the aid freeze is related to concerns that weapons and funds will fall into the hands of ISIL. Based on information obtained by Reuters, five FSA groups have confirmed that they received funding and military support from an source called "MOM operations room." Several countries besides the U.S. had also contributed to the funding of the FSA. These countries include Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. On April 6, 2017, Al-Jazeera reported that funding to the FSA was partially restored. Based on information provided by two FSA sources, the new military operation room will receive its funds from the coalition "Friends of Syria". The coalition consists of members from the U.S, Turkey, Western Europe, and Gulf states, which previously supported the military operation known as MOM.

It was reported in July 2017 that President Donald Trump had ordered a "phasing out" of the CIA's support for anti-Assad rebels.

Reorganization

On March 6, 2015, the office of the D/CIA issued an unclassified edition of a statement by the Director, titled "Our Agency's Blueprint for the Future", as a press release for public consumption. The press release announced sweeping plans for the reorganization and reform of the CIA, which the Director believes will bring the CIA more in line with the Agency doctrine called the 'Strategic Direction'. Among the principal changes disclosed include the establishment of a new directorate, the Directorate of Digital Innovation, which is responsible for designing and crafting the digital technology to be used by the Agency, to keep the CIA always ahead of its enemies. The Directorate of Digital Innovation will also train CIA staff in the use of this technology, to prepare the CIA for the future, and it will also use the technological revolution to deal with cyber-terrorism and other perceived threats. The new directorate will be the chief cyber-espionage arm of the Agency going forward.

Other changes which were announced include the formation of a Talent Development Center of Excellence, the enhancement and expansion of the CIA University and the creation of the office of the Chancellor to head the CIA University in order to consolidate and unify recruitment and training efforts. The office of the Executive Director will be empowered and expanded and the secretarial offices serving the Executive Director will be streamlined. The restructuring of the entire Agency is to be revamped according to a new model whereby governance is modelled after the structure and hierarchy of corporations, said to increase the efficiency of workflow and to greatly enable the Executive Director to manage day-to-day activity. As well, another stated intention was to establish 'Mission Centers', each one to deal with a specific geographic region of the world, which will bring the full collaboration and joint efforts of the five Directorates together under one roof. While the Directorate heads will still retain ultimate authority over their respective Directorate, the Mission Centers will be led by an Assistant Director who will work with the capabilities and talents of all five Directorates on mission specific goals for the parts of the world which they are given responsibility for.

The unclassified version of the document ends with the announcement that the National Clandestine Service (NCS) will be reverting to its original Directorate name, the Directorate of Operations. The Directorate of Intelligence is also being renamed, it will now be the Directorate of Analysis.

Drones

A new policy introduced by President Barack Obama removed the authority of the CIA to launch drone attacks and allowed these attacks only under Department of Defense command. This change was reversed by President Donald Trump, who authorized CIA drone strikes on suspected terrorists.

Open Source Intelligence

Further information: Foreign Broadcast Information Service and Open Source Center

Until the 2004 reorganization of the intelligence community, one of the "services of common concern" that the CIA provided was Open Source Intelligence from the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). FBIS, which had absorbed the Joint Publication Research Service, a military organization that translated documents, moved into the National Open Source Enterprise under the Director of National Intelligence.

During the Reagan administration, Michael Sekora (assigned to the DIA), worked with agencies across the intelligence community, including the CIA, to develop and deploy a technology-based competitive strategy system called Project Socrates. Project Socrates was designed to utilize open source intelligence gathering almost exclusively. The technology-focused Socrates system supported such programs as the Strategic Defense Initiative in addition to private sector projects.

As part of its mandate to gather intelligence, the CIA is looking increasingly online for information, and has become a major consumer of social media. "We're looking at YouTube, which carries some unique and honest-to-goodness intelligence," said Doug Naquin, director of the DNI Open Source Center (OSC) at CIA headquarters. "We're looking at chat rooms and things that didn't exist five years ago, and trying to stay ahead." CIA launched a Twitter account in June 2014.

Outsourcing and privatization

See also: Intelligence Outsourcing

Many of the duties and functions of Intelligence Community activities, not the CIA alone, are being outsourced and privatized. Mike McConnell, former Director of National Intelligence, was about to publicize an investigation report of outsourcing by U.S. intelligence agencies, as required by Congress. However, this report was then classified. Hillhouse speculates that this report includes requirements for the CIA to report:

• different standards for government employees and contractors;
• contractors providing similar services to government workers;
• analysis of costs of contractors vs. employees;
• an assessment of the appropriateness of outsourced activities;
• an estimate of the number of contracts and contractors;
• comparison of compensation for contractors and government employees;
• attrition analysis of government employees;
• descriptions of positions to be converted back to the employee model;
• an evaluation of accountability mechanisms;
• an evaluation of procedures for "conducting oversight of contractors to ensure identification and prosecution of criminal violations, financial waste, fraud, or other abuses committed by contractors or contract personnel"; and
• an "identification of best practices of accountability mechanisms within service contracts."

According to investigative journalist Tim Shorrock:

...what we have today with the intelligence business is something far more systemic: senior officials leaving their national security and counterterrorism jobs for positions where they are basically doing the same jobs they once held at the CIA, the NSA and other agencies — but for double or triple the salary, and for profit. It's a privatization of the highest order, in which our collective memory and experience in intelligence — our crown jewels of spying, so to speak — are owned by corporate America. Yet, there is essentially no government oversight of this private sector at the heart of our intelligence empire. And the lines between public and private have become so blurred as to be nonexistent.

Congress had required an outsourcing report by March 30, 2008.

The Director of National Intelligence has been granted the authority to increase the number of positions (FTEs) on elements in the Intelligence Community by up to 10% should there be a determination that activities performed by a contractor should be done by a U.S. government employee."

Part of the contracting problem comes from Congressional restrictions on the number of employees in the IC. According to Hillhouse, this resulted in 70% of the de facto workforce of the CIA's National Clandestine Service being made up of contractors. "After years of contributing to the increasing reliance upon contractors, Congress is now providing a framework for the conversion of contractors into federal government employees—more or less."

As with most government agencies, building equipment often is contracted. The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), responsible for the development and operation of airborne and spaceborne sensors, long was a joint operation of the CIA and the United States Department of Defense. NRO had been significantly involved in the design of such sensors, but the NRO, then under DCI authority, contracted more of the design that had been their tradition, and to a contractor without extensive reconnaissance experience, Boeing. The next-generation satellite Future Imagery Architecture project "how does heaven look", which missed objectives after $4 billion in cost overruns, was the result of this contract.

Some of the cost problems associated with intelligence come from one agency, or even a group within an agency, not accepting the compartmented security practices for individual projects, requiring expensive duplication.

Controversies

See also: 1953 Iranian coup d'état, 1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, CIA activities in Indonesia, and Operation Condor

Supplemental material used in Maxwell Taylor's report on the Bay of Pigs invasion.

The CIA: a forgotten history, by William Blum and Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA by Tim Weiner have accused the CIA of various covert actions, and human rights abuses. The CIA has responded to the claims made in Weiner's book, and Jeffrey T. Richelson of the National Security Archive has also been critical of it. Intelligence expert David Wise faulted Weiner for portraying Allen Dulles as "a doddering old man" rather than the "shrewd professional spy" he knew and for refusing "to concede that the agency's leaders may have acted from patriotic motives or that the CIA ever did anything right," but concluded: "Legacy of Ashes succeeds as both journalism and history, and it is must reading for anyone interested in the CIA or American intelligence since World War II." In 2017, the CIA faced heat over WikiLeaks. They released a statement saying they conduct missions to aggressively collect intelligence, but denied the authenticity of the Wikileaks documents.

Domestic wiretapping

In 1969, at the height of the antiwar movement in the US, CIA Director Helms received a message from Henry Kissinger ordering him to spy on the leaders of the groups requesting a moratorium on Vietnam. "Since 1962, three successive presidents had ordered the director of central intelligence to spy on Americans".

Extraordinary rendition

Further information: Extraordinary rendition, Black site, and Rendition aircraft

The US Senate Report on CIA Detention Interrogation Program that details the use of torture during CIA detention and interrogation.

Extraordinary rendition is the apprehension and extrajudicial transfer of a person from one country to another.

The term "torture by proxy" is used by some critics to describe situations in which the CIA and other US agencies have transferred suspected terrorists to countries known to employ torture, whether they meant to enable torture or not. It has been claimed, though, that torture has been employed with the knowledge or acquiescence of US agencies (a transfer of anyone to anywhere for the purpose of torture is a violation of US law), although Condoleezza Rice (then the United States Secretary of State) stated that:

the United States has not transported anyone, and will not transport anyone, to a country when we believe he will be tortured. Where appropriate, the United States seeks assurances that transferred persons will not be tortured.

Whilst the Obama administration has tried to distance itself from some of the harshest counterterrorism techniques, it has also said that at least some forms of renditions will continue. The administration continued to allow rendition only "to a country with jurisdiction over that individual (for prosecution of that individual)" when there is a diplomatic assurance "that they will not be treated inhumanely."

The US program has also prompted several official investigations in Europe into alleged secret detentions and unlawful inter-state transfers involving Council of Europe member states. A June 2006 report from the Council of Europe estimated 100 people had been kidnapped by the CIA on EU territory (with the cooperation of Council of Europe members), and rendered to other countries, often after having transited through secret detention centres ("black sites") used by the CIA, some located in Europe. According to the separate European Parliament report of February 2007, the CIA has conducted 1,245 flights, many of them to destinations where suspects could face torture, in violation of article 3 of the United Nations Convention Against Torture.

Following the 11 September 2001 attacks the United States, in particular the CIA, has been accused of rendering hundreds of people suspected by the government of being terrorists—or of aiding and abetting terrorist organisations—to third-party states such as Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Uzbekistan. Such "ghost detainees" are kept outside judicial oversight, often without ever entering US territory, and may or may not ultimately be devolved to the custody of the United States.

On October 4, 2001, a secret arrangement was made in Brussels, by all members of NATO. Lord George Robertson, British defence secretary and later NATO's secretary-general, would later explain that NATO members agree to provide "blanket overflight clearances for the United States and other allies' aircraft for military flights related to operations against terrorism."

Security failures

Critics assert that funding the Afghan mujahideen (Operation Cyclone) played a role in causing the September 11 attacks.

On December 30, 2009, a suicide attack occurred in the Forward Operating Base Chapman attack in the province of Khost, Afghanistan. Seven CIA officers, including the chief of the base, were killed and six others seriously wounded in the attack.

Counterintelligence failures

Perhaps the most disruptive period involving counterintelligence was James Jesus Angleton's search for a mole, based on the statements of a Soviet defector, Anatoliy Golitsyn. A second defector, Yuri Nosenko, challenged Golitsyn's claims, with the two calling one another Soviet double agents. Many CIA officers fell under career-ending suspicion; the details of the relative truths and untruths from Nosenko and Golitsyn may never be released, or, in fact, may not be fully understood. The accusations also crossed the Atlantic to the British intelligence services, who also were damaged by molehunts.

Edward Lee Howard, David Henry Barnett, both field operations officers sold secrets to Russia, and William Kampiles, a low-level worker in the CIA 24-hour Operations Center. Kampiles sold the Soviets the detailed operational manual for the KH-11 reconnaissance satellite.

Human rights concerns

Main article: Human rights violations by the CIA

See also: Senate Intelligence Committee report on CIA torture

Operation Condor participants. Green: active members. Blue: collaborator (USA).

The CIA has been called into question for, at times, using torture, funding and training of groups and organizations that would later participate in killing of civilians and other non-combatants and would try or succeed in overthrowing democratically elected governments, human experimentation, and targeted killings and assassinations. The CIA has also been accused of a lack of financial and whistleblower controls which has led to waste and fraud.

The Institute on Medicine as a Profession and the non-profit organization Open Society Foundations reviewed public records into the medical professions alleging complicity in the abuse of prisoners suspected of terrorism who were held in U.S. custody during the years after 9/11." The reports found that health professionals "Aided cruel and degrading interrogations; Helped devise and implement practices designed to maximize disorientation and anxiety so as to make detainees more malleable for interrogation; and Participated in the application of excruciatingly painful methods of force-feeding of mentally competent detainees carrying out hunger strikes" are not all that surprising. Medical professionals were sometimes used at black sites to monitor detainee health. Whether or not the physicians were compelled is an open question.

Other human rights issues that are controversial include the case of Edward Snowden. However, the significance of human right does not fall into this case regarding whether Snowden received his fair trial or not. Rather, the human rights associated with the Snowden leaks are regarding the types of document Snowden released. Snowden released a significant amount of information on the U.S. government's surveillance program of its citizens to The Washington Post as well as foreign news reporters.

 Particularly, "between on or about June 5, 2013, and June 9, 2013, classified information was published on the internet and in print by multiple newspapers, including The Washington Post and The Guardian. The articles and internet postings by The Washington Post and The Guardian included classified documents that were marked TOP SECRET. The Washington Post and The Guardian later revealed that SNOWDEN was the principal source for the classified information on or about June 9, 2013, in a videotaped interview with The Guardian, admitted that he was the person who illegally provided those documents to reporters. Evidence indicates that SNOWDEN had access to the classified documents in question; accessed those documents; and, subsequently, provided those documents to media outlets without authorization and in violation of U.S. law."

Furthermore, the leaks included documents at many levels of the National Security Agency (NSA) electronic surveillance activities. "The Snowden leaks have generated broad public debate over issues of security, privacy, and legality inherent in the NSA's surveillance of communications by American citizens. The records include: White House and ODNI efforts to explain, justify, and defend the programs; Correspondence between outside critics and executive branch officials; Fact sheets and white papers distributed (and sometimes later withdrawn) by the government; Key laws and court decisions (both Supreme Court and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court); Documents on the Total Information Awareness (later Terrorist Information Awareness, or TIA) program, an earlier proposal for massive data collection Manuals on how to exploit the Internet for intelligence."

External investigations and document releases

Main article: Official reports by the U.S. Government on the CIA

Several investigations (e.g., the Church Committee, Rockefeller Commission, Pike Committee, etc.) have been conducted about the CIA, and many documents have been declassified.

Influencing public opinion and law enforcement

See also: CIA influence on public opinion, CIA and the media, CIA in fiction, Robertson Panel, and Operation Mockingbird

The CIA sometimes finds itself in conflict with other parts of the government when there is disagreement over the legality of specific covert programs. There is always the risk that one part of the government may make the covert operations of another part of the government public.

Drug trafficking

Main articles: CIA transnational anti-crime and anti-drug activities and Allegations of CIA drug trafficking

Two offices of CIA Directorate of Analysis have analytical responsibilities in this area. The Office of Transnational Issues applies unique functional expertise to assess existing and emerging threats to U.S. national security and provides the most senior U.S. policymakers, military planners, and law enforcement with analysis, warning, and crisis support.

CIA Crime and Narcotics Center researches information on international narcotics trafficking and organized crime for policymakers and the law enforcement community. Since CIA has no domestic police authority, it sends its analytic information to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and other law enforcement organizations, such as the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the United States Department of the Treasury (OFAC).

Another part of CIA, the Directorate of Operations, collects human intelligence (HUMINT) in these areas.

Research by Dr. Alfred W. McCoy, Gary Webb, and others has pointed to CIA involvement in narcotics trafficking across the globe, although the CIA officially denies such allegations. During the Cold War, when numerous soldiers participated in transport of Southeast Asian heroin to the United States by the airline Air America, the CIA's role in such traffic was reportedly rationalized as "recapture" of related profits to prevent possible enemy control of such assets.

Alleged lying to Congress

Former Speaker of the United States House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi has stated that the CIA repeatedly misled Congress since 2001 about waterboarding and other torture, though Pelosi admitted to being told about the programs. Six members of Congress have claimed that Director of the CIA Leon Panetta admitted that over a period of several years since 2001 the CIA deceived Congress, including affirmatively lying to Congress. Some congressmen believe that these "lies" to Congress are similar to CIA lies to Congress from earlier periods.

Covert programs hidden from Congress

On July 10, 2009, House Intelligence subcommittee Chairwoman Representative Jan Schakowsky (D, IL) announced the termination of an unnamed CIA covert program described as "very serious" in nature which had been kept secret from Congress for eight years.

It's not as if this was an oversight and over the years it just got buried. There was a decision under several directors of the CIA and administration not to tell the Congress.

Jan Schakowsky, Chairwoman, U.S. House of Representatives Intelligence Subcommittee

CIA Director Panetta had ordered an internal investigation to determine why Congress had not been informed about the covert program. Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee Representative Silvestre Reyes announced that he is considering an investigation into alleged CIA violations of the National Security Act, which requires with limited exception that Congress be informed of covert activities. Investigations and Oversight Subcommittee Chairwoman Schakowsky indicated that she would forward a request for congressional investigation to HPSCI Chairman Silvestre Reyes.

"Director Panetta did brief us two weeks ago—I believe it was on the 24th of June—... and, as had been reported, did tell us that he was told that the vice president had ordered that the program not be briefed to the Congress."

Dianne Feinstein, Chairwoman of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

As mandated by Title 50 of the United States Code Chapter 15, Subchapter III, when it becomes necessary to limit access to covert operations findings that could affect vital interests of the U.S., as soon as possible the President must report at a minimum to the Gang of Eight (the leaders of each of the two parties from both the Senate and House of Representatives, and the chairs and ranking members of both the Senate Committee and House Committee for intelligence). The House is expected to support the 2010 Intelligence Authorization Bill including a provision that would require the President to inform more than 40 members of Congress about covert operations. The Obama administration threatened to veto the final version of a bill that included such a provision. On July 16, 2008, the fiscal 2009 Intelligence Authorization Bill was approved by House majority containing stipulations that 75% of money sought for covert actions would be held until all members of the House Intelligence panel were briefed on sensitive covert actions. Under the George W. Bush administration, senior advisers to the President issued a statement indicating that if a bill containing this provision reached the President, they would recommend that he veto the bill.

The program was rumored vis-à-vis leaks made by anonymous government officials on July 23, to be an assassinations program, but this remains unconfirmed. "The whole committee was stunned....I think this is as serious as it gets," stated Anna Eshoo, Chairman, Subcommittee on Intelligence Community Management, U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI).

Allegations by Director Panetta indicate that details of a secret counterterrorism program were withheld from Congress under orders from former U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney. This prompted Senator Feinstein and Senator Patrick Leahy, chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee to insist that no one should go outside the law. "The agency hasn't discussed publicly the nature of the effort, which remains classified," said agency spokesman Paul Gimigliano.

The Wall Street Journal reported, citing former intelligence officials familiar with the matter, that the program was an attempt to carry out a 2001 presidential authorization to capture or kill al-Qaeda operatives.

Intelligence Committee investigation

On July 17, 2009, the House Intelligence Committee said it was launching a formal investigation into the secret program. Representative Silvestre Reyes announced the probe will look into "whether there was any past decision or direction to withhold information from the committee".

"Is giving your kid a test in school an inhibition on his free learning?" Holt said. "Sure, there are some people who are happy to let intelligence agencies go about their business unexamined. But I think most people when they think about it will say that you will get better intelligence if the intelligence agencies don't operate in an unexamined fashion."

Rush Holt, Chairman, House Select Intelligence Oversight Panel, Committee on Appropriations

Congresswoman Jan Schakowsky (D, IL), Chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, who called for the investigation, stated that the investigation was intended to address CIA failures to inform Congress fully or accurately about four issues: C.I.A. involvement in the downing of a missionary plane mistaken for a narcotics flight in Peru in 2001, and two "matters that remain classified", as well as the rumored-assassinations question. In addition, the inquiry is likely to look at the Bush administration's program of eavesdropping without warrants and its detention and interrogation program. U.S. Intelligence Chief Dennis Blair testified before the House Intelligence Committee on February 3, 2010, that the U.S. intelligence community is prepared to kill U.S. citizens if they threaten other Americans or the United States. The American Civil Liberties Union has said this policy is "particularly troubling" because U.S. citizens "retain their constitutional right to due process even when abroad." The ACLU also "expressed serious concern about the lack of public information about the policy and the potential for abuse of unchecked executive power."

Improper search of computers used by Senate investigators

In July 2014 CIA Director John O. Brennan had to apologize to lawmakers because five CIA employees (two lawyers and three computer specialists) had surreptitiously searched Senate Intelligence Committee files and reviewed some committee staff members' e-mail on computers that were supposed to be exclusively for congressional investigators. Brennan ordered the creation of an internal personnel board, led by former senator Evan Bayh, to review the agency employees' conduct and determine "potential disciplinary measures." However, according to some reports, Brennan didn't apologize for spying or doing anything wrong at all, even though his agency had been improperly accessing computers of the Senate Select Intelligence Committee (SSCI) and then, in the words of investigative reporter Dan Froomkin, "speaking a lie". This accusation was based on the CIA Director's earlier denials of Senator Dianne Feinstein's claims that the surreptitious CIA search of the SSCI computers occurred, was inappropriate, or "violated the separation of powers principles embodied in the United States Constitution, including the Speech and Debate clause" or other laws.

Resignation of officials and agents who would not work for Donald Trump

In February 2017, reports emerged that key experts within the CIA were resigning because they would not work for U.S. President Donald Trump. The Middle East Eye reported that two agents, Americans, who operated spy-rings within ISIS had resigned, because they did not want to see the contacts who worked for them sacrificed due to incompetence and anti-Muslim prejudice from within Trump's inner circle. Edward Price, a CIA official since 2006, stirred controversy when he published an op-ed in The Washington Post, explaining why he surprised himself by resigning, after he perceived Trump using his visit to CIA HQ for partisan political posturing.

WikiLeaks' disclosure of CIA's cyber tools

Main article: Vault 7

In March 2017, WikiLeaks has published more than 8,000 documents on the CIA. The confidential documents, codenamed Vault 7, dated from 2013–2016, included details on the CIA's software capabilities, such as the ability to compromise cars, smart TVs, web browsers (including Google Chrome, Microsoft Edge, Firefox, and Opera), and the operating systems of most smartphones (including Apple's iOS and Google's Android), as well as other operating systems such as Microsoft Windows, macOS, and Linux. WikiLeaks did not name the source, but said that the files had "circulated among former U.S. government hackers and contractors in an unauthorized manner, one of whom has provided WikiLeaks with portions of the archive."

In a 2017 speech addressing CSIS, CIA Director Mike Pompeo referred to Wikileaks as "a non-state hostile intelligence service often abetted by state actors like Russia". He also said: "To give them the space to crush us with misappropriated secrets is a perversion of what our great Constitution stands for. It ends now."

In fiction

Main article: CIA in fiction

Fictional depictions of the CIA exist in many books, films and video games. Some fiction draws, at least in parts, on actual historical events, while other works are entirely fictional. The television series Chuck (2007), was based solely on a man who accidentally sees secret CIA encryptions and eventually becomes an asset/liabilty, and later on an agent in the agency. Films include Charlie Wilson's War (2007), based on the story of U.S. Congressman Charlie Wilson and CIA operative Gust Avrakotos, who supported the Afghan mujahideen, and The Good Shepherd (2006), a fictional spy film produced and directed by Robert De Niro based loosely on the development of counter-intelligence in the CIA. The fictional character Jack Ryan in Tom Clancy's books is a CIA analyst. Graham Greene's The Quiet American is about a CIA agent operating in Southeast Asia. Fictional depictions of the CIA are also used in video games, such as Tom Clancy's Splinter Cell, Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2 and Call of Duty: Black Ops.

See also

• Abu Omar case
• Blue sky memo
• CIA's relationship with the United States Military
• Classified information in the United States
• Freedom of Information Act (United States)
• George Bush Center for Intelligence
• History of the Central Intelligence Agency
• Intellipedia
• Kryptos
• National Intelligence Board
• Operation Peter Pan
• Project MKUltra
• Reagan Doctrine
• Office of Strategic Services
• Title 32 of the Code of Federal Regulations
• U.S. Army and CIA interrogation manuals
• United States and state-sponsored terrorism
• United States Department of Homeland Security
• United States Intelligence Community
• The World Factbook, published by the CIA

References

• Immerman, Richard H. (1982). The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention. University of Texas Press. ISBN 978-0-292-71083-2. 
• Weiner, Tim (2007). Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA. New York: Doubleday. ISBN 0-385-51445-X. OCLC 82367780. 

Further reading

• Agee, Philip (1975). Inside the Company: CIA Diary. Harmondsworth: Penguin. ISBN 0-140-04007-2. 
• Aldrich, Richard J. (2001). The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence. London: John Murray. ISBN 0-7195-5423-3. OCLC 46513534. 
• Andrew, Christopher (1996). For the President's Eyes Only. HarperCollins. ISBN 0-00-638071-9. 
• Baer, Robert (2003). Sleeping with the Devil: How Washington Sold Our Soul for Saudi Crude. Crown. ISBN 1-4000-5021-9. 
• Bearden, Milton; James Risen (2003). The Main Enemy: The Inside Story of the CIA's Final Showdown With the KGB. Random House. ISBN 0-679-46309-7. 
• Coll, Steve (2004). Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001. Penguin Group. ISBN 9781594200076. 
• Dujmovic, Nicholas, "Drastic Actions Short of War: The Origins and Application of CIA's Covert Paramilitary Function in the Early Cold War," Journal of Military History, 76 (July 2012), 775–808
• Gibson, Bryan R. (2015). Sold Out? US Foreign Policy, Iraq, the Kurds, and the Cold War. Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 978-1-137-48711-7. 
• Johnson, Loch K. (1991). America's Secret Power: The CIA in a Democratic Society. Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-505490-3. 
• Jones, Ishmael (2010). The Human Factor: Inside the CIA's Dysfunctional Intelligence Culture. Encounter Books. ISBN 978-1-59403-223-3. 
• Jones, Milo; Silberzahn, Philippe (2013). Constructing Cassandra, Reframing Intelligence Failure at the CIA, 1947–2001. Stanford University Press. ISBN 978-0804793360. 
• Marchetti, Victor; John D. Marks (1974). The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence. Knopf. ISBN 0-394-48239-5. 
• McCoy, Alfred W. (1972). The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia. Harper Colophon. ISBN 978-0-06-090328-2. 
• McCoy, Alfred W. (2006). A Question of Torture: CIA Interrogation, from the Cold War to the War on Terror. New York: Owl Books (Henry Holt & Co.). ISBN 0-8050-8248-4. OCLC 78821099. 
• Kessler, Ronald (2003). The CIA at War: Inside the Secret Campaign Against Terror. St. Martin's Press. ISBN 0-312-31932-0. 
• Kinzer, Stephen (2003). All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror. John Wiley & Sons. ISBN 9780470185490. 
• Mahle, Melissa Boyle (2004). Denial and Deception: An Insider's View of the CIA from Iran-Contra to 9/11. Nation Books. ISBN 1-56025-649-4. 
• Powers, Thomas (1979). The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms & the CIA. Alfred A. Knopf. ISBN 9780394507774. 
• Prouty, L. Fletcher (Col. USAF, (Ret.)) (1973). The Secret Team: The CIA and Its Allies In Control of the World. Ballantine Books. ISBN 0-345-23776-5. 
• Rositzke, Harry (1977). The CIA's Secret Operations. Reader's Digest Press. ISBN 0-88349-116-8. 
• Ruth, Steven (2011). My Twenty Years as a CIA Officer: It's All About The Mission. Charleston, SC: CreateSpace. ISBN 978-1-4565-7170-2. 
• Sheymov, Victor (1993). Tower of Secrets. U.S. Naval Institute Press. ISBN 978-1-55750-764-8. 
• Smith, W. Thomas, Jr. (2003). Encyclopedia of the Central Intelligence Agency. Facts on File. ISBN 0-8160-4667-0. 
• Turner, Stansfield (2006). Burn Before Reading: Presidents, CIA Directors, and Secret Intelligence. Hyperion. ISBN 0-7868-8666-8. 
• Wallace, Robert; Melton, H. Keith; Schlesinger, Henry R. (2008). Spycraft: The Secret History of the CIA's Spytechs, from Communism to al-Qaeda. New York: Dutton. ISBN 0-525-94980-1. OCLC 18255288. 
• Wise, David; Ross, Thomas B. (1964). The Invisible Government. Random House. ISBN 978-0394430775. 

External links

• Official website
• CIA Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room
• Landscapes of Secrecy: The CIA in History, Fiction and Memory (2011)
• Works by or about Central Intelligence Agency at Internet Archive
• Works by Central Intelligence Agency at LibriVox (public domain audiobooks)
• Central Intelligence Collection at Internet Archive

UpToDate Contents

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• 1. 抗癌剤および放射線療法による卵巣機能不全 ovarian failure due to anticancer drugs and radiation
• 2. 早期乳癌に対する補助化学療法の急性副作用 acute side effects of adjuvant chemotherapy for early stage breast cancer
• 3. 早期乳癌における骨吸収抑制剤の使用の概要 overview of the use of osteoclast inhibitors in early breast cancer
• 4. 閉経前の骨粗鬆症の評価および治療 evaluation and treatment of premenopausal osteoporosis
• 5. 乳癌生存者における再発パターンおよび治療の長期合併症 patterns of relapse and long term complications of therapy in breast cancer survivors

English Journal

• Effect of glutathione during bottle storage of sparkling wine.

• Webber V1, Dutra SV2, Spinelli FR3, Carnieli GJ2, Cardozo A4, Vanderlinde R3.
• Food chemistry.Food Chem.2017 Feb 1;216:254-9. doi: 10.1016/j.foodchem.2016.08.042. Epub 2016 Aug 17.
• Reduced glutathione (GSH) is an efficient antioxidant on limiting browning, losing varietal aromas and off-flavor formation. Therefore, this study aims to evaluate the effect of GSH addition (10, 20 and 30mgL(-1)) after the disgorging of the sparkling wine during storage. The sparkling wines were an
• PMID 27596417

• Stiffness of Intact Endothelial Cells From Fresh Aortic Bifurcations of Atherosclerotic Rabbits-Atomic Force Microscopic Study.

• Hayashi K1,2, Higaki M3.
• Journal of cellular physiology.J Cell Physiol.2017 Jan;232(1):7-13. doi: 10.1002/jcp.25379. Epub 2016 Aug 10.
• Stiffness of intact endothelial cells (ECs) in the abdominal aorta (AA) and in the medial and lateral wall of the common iliac artery (CIA(Medial) and CIA(Lateral), respectively), which were freshly obtained from cholesterol-fed rabbits, were measured with an atomic force microscopic indentation met
• PMID 26991605

• Multispectrum analysis of the oxygen A-band.

• Drouin BJ1, Benner DC2, Brown LR1, Cich MJ1, Crawford TJ1, Devi VM2, Guillaume A1, Hodges JT3, Mlawer EJ4, Robichaud DJ5, Oyafuso F1, Payne VH1, Sung K1, Wishnow EH6, Yu S1.
• Journal of quantitative spectroscopy & radiative transfer.J Quant Spectrosc Radiat Transf.2017 Jan;186:118-138. Epub 2016 Apr 11.
• Retrievals of atmospheric composition from near-infrared measurements require measurements of airmass to better than the desired precision of the composition. The oxygen bands are obvious choices to quantify airmass since the mixing ratio of oxygen is fixed over the full range of atmospheric conditi
• PMID 27840454

Japanese Journal

• 本当は効果なし? CIA虐待尋問の科学 : 拷問

• シュナイダーマン R・M
• Newsweek 27(23), 43-45, 2012-06-20
• NAID 40019299139

• オバマが変えた対テロ戦争 : アメリカ 軍とCIAの勇み足にブレーキをかけ困難な選択に悩みつつもオバマ政権は攻撃を拡大中

• クレードマン ダニエル
• Newsweek 27(22), 30-34, 2012-06-13
• NAID 40019283263

Related Pictures

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★リンクテーブル★

リンク元	「総腸骨動脈」
拡張検索	「CIAS1 gene」「CIALIS」
関連記事	「C」「CI」

「総腸骨動脈」

　　[★]

英

common iliac artery (Z), CIA

ラ

arteria iliaca communis

関

内腸骨動脈

• 図：N.256

起始

• 腹大動脈

走行

• 腹大動脈からL4の高さで分岐 (KL.408)
• 大腰筋の前を下外側に走行し、仙腸関節の前で内腸骨動脈と外腸骨動脈に分岐

枝

• 内腸骨動脈
• 外腸骨動脈

Henry Gray (1825-1861). Anatomy of the Human Body. 1918.

「CIAS1 gene」

　　[★]

同

cold-induced anti-inflammatory syndrome

「CIALIS」

　　[★] タダラフィル

関

tadalafil

「C」

　　[★]

• 炭素 carbon
• シトシン cytosine
• システイン cysteine
• シチジン
• セルシウス度 摂氏 degrees Celsius degree C
• 産婦人科領域で「子宮外頚 子宮外頚部 exocervix」を表現するための略語

　 　 　 　

「CI」

　　[★]

• 心係数 cardiac index
• 信頼区間 confidence interval
• キュリー単位 curie　→　Ci