Toward a typology of health-related informal credit: an exploration of borrowing practices for paying for health care by the poor in Cambodia.
Ir P, Jacobs B, Meessen B, Damme W.AbstractABSTRACT: BACKGROUND: Borrowing money is a common strategy to cope with health care costs. The impact of borrowing on households can be severe, leading to indebtedness and further impoverishment. However, the available literature on borrowing practices for health is limited. We explore borrowing practices for paying for health care by the poor in Cambodia and provide a typology, associated conditions, and the extent of the phenomenon.
BMC health services research.BMC Health Serv Res.2012 Nov 7;12(1):383. [Epub ahead of print]
ABSTRACT: BACKGROUND: Borrowing money is a common strategy to cope with health care costs. The impact of borrowing on households can be severe, leading to indebtedness and further impoverishment. However, the available literature on borrowing practices for health is limited. We explore borrowing pra
Net Present Biodiversity Value and the Design of Biodiversity Offsets.
Overton JM, Stephens RT, Ferrier S.SourceLandcare Research, Private Bag 3127, Hamilton, New Zealand, OvertonJ@LandcareResearch.co.nz.
Ambio.Ambio.2012 Sep 6. [Epub ahead of print]
There is an urgent need to develop sound theory and practice for biodiversity offsets to provide a better basis for offset multipliers, to improve accounting for time delays in offset repayments, and to develop a common framework for evaluating in-kind and out-of-kind offsets. Here, we apply concept
Microcredit games with noisy signals: Contagion and free-riding
Kono Hisaki
Journal of the Japanese and International Economies 33, 96-113, 2014-09
… By using data from experimental repayment games conducted in Vietnam, with noisy signals that resemble actual microcredit programs, we found that subjects were motivated to free-ride under the joint liability scheme. … Analyses reveal that the free-riding tendency may be led by the irresponsiveness of repayment and shouldering behavior to the partner's seemingly strategic default in the previous round. …