Perdurantism or perdurance theory is a philosophical theory of persistence and identity.[1] The perdurantist view is that an individual has distinct temporal parts throughout its existence. Perdurantism is usually presented as the antipode to endurantism, the view that an individual is wholly present at every moment of its existence.[1]
The use of "endure" and "perdure" to distinguish two ways in which an object can be thought to persist can be traced to David Kellogg Lewis (1986). However, contemporary debate has demonstrated the difficulties in defining perdurantism (and also endurantism). For instance, the work of Ted Sider (2001) has suggested that even enduring objects can have temporal parts, and it is more accurate to define perdurantism as being the claim that objects have a temporal part at every instant that they exist. However, as Stuchlik (2003) states, the stage theory will not work under the possibility of gunky time, which states that for every interval of time, there is a sub-interval, and according to Zimmerman (1996), there have been many self-professed perdurantists who believe that time is gunky or contains no instants. Some perdurantists think this means there are no instants, since they define these as intervals of time with no subintervals. Currently there is no universally acknowledged definition of perdurantism (see also McKinnon (2002) and Merricks (1999)). Others argue that this problem is avoided by creating time as a continuous function, rather than a discrete one.
Perdurantism is also referred to as "four-dimensionalism" (by Ted Sider, in particular) but perdurantism also applies if one believes there are temporal but non-spatial abstract entities (like immaterial souls or universals of the sort accepted by David Malet Armstrong).[2]
Contents
- 1 Worm theorists and stage theorists
- 2 Arguments supporting perdurantism
- 3 See also
- 4 External links
- 5 Notes
- 6 References
Worm theorists and stage theorists
Perdurantists break into two distinct sub-groups, worm theorists, and stage theorists.
Worm theorists believe that a persisting object is composed of the various temporal parts that it has. Thus, they believe that all persisting objects are four-dimensional "worms" that stretch across space-time, and that you are mistaken in believing that chairs, mountains, and people are simply three-dimensional.[3][4]
Stage theorists take you to be identical with a particular temporal part at any given time. So, in a manner of speaking, a subject only exists for an instantaneous period of time. However there are other temporal parts at other times which that subject is related to in a certain way (Sider talks of "modal counterpart relations", whilst Hawley talks of "non-Humean relations") such that when someone says that they were a child, or that they will be an elderly person, these things are true, because they bear a special "identity-like" relation to a temporal part that is a child (that exists in the past) or a temporal part that is an elderly person (that exists in the future). Stage theorists are sometimes called "exdurantists".
Arguments supporting perdurantism
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This section requires expansion. (December 2010) |
A number of authors have advanced arguments supporting perdurantism, ranging from problems in logic, to the problem of temporary intrinsics, to the problems of the Ship of Theseus. A survey can be found in Sider (2001).
See also
External links
- Temporal parts at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Notes
- ^ a b Temporal parts - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
- ^ Brian Garrett (25 February 2011). What Is This Thing Called Metaphysics?. Taylor & Francis. pp. 54—55. ISBN 978-1-136-79269-4.
- ^ Douglas Ehring (25 August 2011). Tropes: Properties, Objects, and Mental Causation. Oxford University Press. p. 100. ISBN 978-0-19-960853-9.
- ^ Timothy D. Miller (2007). Continuous Creation, Persistence, and Secondary Causation: An Essay in the Metaphysics of Theism. ProQuest. pp. 75–77. ISBN 978-0-549-39708-3.
References
- Lewis, D.K. 1986. On the Plurality of Worlds Oxford: Blackwell
- McKinnon, N. 2002. "The Endurance/Perdurance Distinction", The Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80:3 p. 288-306.
- Merricks, T. 1999. "Persistence, Parts and Presentism", Noûs 33 p. 421-38.
- Sider, T. 2001. Four-Dimensionalism Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Joshua M. Stuchlik "Not All Worlds Are Stages" Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition Vol. 116, No. 3 (Dec., 2003), pp. 309–321
- Zimmerman, D. 1996. "Persistence and Presentism", Philosophical Papers 25: 2.
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