monopolization

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domination (of a market or commodity) to the exclusion of others (同)monopolisation

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独占,専売

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出典(authority):フリー百科事典『ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』「2018/03/27 09:26:45」(JST)

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In US antitrust law, monopolization is an offense and the main categories of prohibited behavior include exclusive dealing, price discrimination, refusing to supply an essential facility, product tying and predatory pricing. Monopolization is an offense under Section 2 of the American Sherman Antitrust Act 1890. It has a specific legal meaning, which is parallel to the "abuse" of a dominant position in EU competition law, under TFEU article 102. The Sherman Act 1890 §2 states that any person "who shall monopolize . . . any part of the trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations shall be deemed guilty of a felony." Section 2 also forbids "attempts to monopolize" and "conspiracies to monopolize." Generally this means that corporations may not act in ways that have been identified as contrary to precedent cases.

Jurisprudential meaning

Under long-established precedent, the offense of monopolization under Section 2 has two elements. First, that the defendant possesses monopoly power in a properly-defined market and second that the defendant obtained or maintained that power through conduct deemed unlawfully exclusionary. The mere fact that conduct disadvantages rivals does not, without more, constitute the sort of exclusionary conduct that satisfies this second element. Instead, such conduct must exclude rivals on some basis other than efficiency.

For several decades courts drew the line between efficient and inefficient exclusion by asking whether the conduct under scrutiny was "competition on the merits." Courts equated such competition on the merits with unilateral conduct such as product improvement, the realization of economies of scale, innovation, and the like. Such conduct was lawful per se, since it constituted the normal operation of economic forces that a free economy should encourage. At the same time, courts condemned as "unlawful exclusion" tying contracts, exclusive dealing, and other agreements that disadvantaged rivals.^[1] This distinction reflected the economic theory of the time, which saw no beneficial purposes for what Professor Oliver Williamson has called non-standard contracts.

More recently, courts have retained the safe harbor^[2] for "competition on the merits." Moreover, the Supreme Court has clarified the standards governing claims of predatory pricing. At the same time, they have relaxed the standards governing other conduct by monopolists. For instance, non-standard contracts that exclude rivals are now lawful if supported by a "valid business reason," unless the plaintiff can establish that the defendant could achieve the same benefits by means of a less restrictive alternative.^[3]

Notes

^ See, e.g., United States v. United Machinery Co., 110 F. 295 (D. Mass. 1953).
^ On the evolution of safe harbors, see Thibault Schrepel, A New Structured Rule of Reason Approach for High-Tech Markets, Suffolk University Law Review, Vol. 50, No. 1, 2017 at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2908838
^ See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992).

References

Areeda, Philip; Turner, Donald F. (1975). "Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act". Harvard Law Review. The Harvard Law Review Association. 88 (4): 697–733. doi:10.2307/1340237. JSTOR 1340237.
Elhaughe, Einer (2003). "Defining Better Monopolization Standards". Stanford Law Review. 56: 253.
Hovenkamp, Herbert (2000). "The Monopolization Offense". Ohio State Law Journal. 61: 1035. ISSN 0048-1572.
Lopatka, John E.; Page, William H. (2001). "Monopolization, Innovation, and Consumer Welfare". George Washington Law Review. 69: 367, 387–92. ISSN 0016-8076.
Meese, Alan (2005). "Monopolization, Exclusion, and the Theory of The Firm". Minnesota Law Review. 89 (3): 743. ISSN 0026-5535.
Piraino, Thomas (2000). "Identifying Monopolists' Exclusionary Conduct Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act". New York University Law Review. 75: 809. ISSN 0028-7881.
Schrepel, Thibault (2017). "A New Structured Rule of Reason Approach for High-Tech Markets". Suffolk Law Review. 50 (1). SSRN 2908838 .

English Journal

Drivers of population genetic differentiation in the wild: isolation by dispersal limitation, isolation by adaptation and isolation by colonization.

Orsini L, Vanoverbeke J, Swillen I, Mergeay J, De Meester L.SourceLaboratory of Aquatic Ecology, Evolution and Conservation, University of Leuven, Ch. Deberiotstraat 32, Leuven, 3000, Belgium.
Molecular ecology.Mol Ecol.2013 Dec;22(24):5983-99. doi: 10.1111/mec.12561. Epub 2013 Nov 18.
Empirical population genetic studies have been dominated by a neutralist view, according to which gene flow and drift are the main forces driving population genetic structure in nature. The neutralist view in essence describes a process of isolation by dispersal limitation (IBDL) that generally lead
PMID 24128305

Molecular phylogeny of the burying beetles (Coleoptera: Silphidae: Nicrophorinae).

Sikes DS, Venables C.SourceUniversity of Alaska Museum, 907 Yukon Dr, University of Alaska Fairbanks, Fairbanks, AK 99775, USA. Electronic address: dssikes@alaska.edu.
Molecular phylogenetics and evolution.Mol Phylogenet Evol.2013 Dec;69(3):552-65. doi: 10.1016/j.ympev.2013.07.022. Epub 2013 Aug 2.
Burying beetles (Silphidae: Nicrophorus) are well-known for their monopolization of small vertebrate carcasses in subterranean crypts and complex biparental care behaviors. They have been the focus of intense behavioral, ecological, and conservation research since the 1980s yet no thorough phylogene
PMID 23911726

Sadness Increases Distraction by Auditory Deviant Stimuli.

Pacheco-Unguetti AP, Parmentier FB.AbstractResearch shows that attention is ineluctably captured away from a focal visual task by rare and unexpected changes (deviants) in an otherwise repeated stream of task-irrelevant auditory distractors (standards). The fundamental cognitive mechanisms underlying this effect have been the object of an increasing number of studies but their sensitivity to mood and emotions remains relatively unexplored despite suggestion of greater distractibility in negative emotional contexts. In this study, we examined the effect of sadness, a widespread form of emotional distress and a symptom of many disorders, on distraction by deviant sounds. Participants received either a sadness induction or a neutral mood induction by means of a mixed procedure based on music and autobiographical recall prior to taking part in an auditory-visual oddball task in which they categorized visual digits while ignoring task-irrelevant sounds. The results showed that although all participants exhibited significantly longer response times in the visual categorization task following the presentation of rare and unexpected deviant sounds relative to that of the standard sound, this distraction effect was significantly greater in participants who had received the sadness induction (a twofold increase). The residual distraction on the subsequent trial (postdeviance distraction) was equivalent in both groups, suggesting that sadness interfered with the disengagement of attention from the deviant sound and back toward the target stimulus. We propose that this disengagement impairment reflected the monopolization of cognitive resources by sadness and/or associated ruminations. Our findings suggest that sadness can increase distraction even when distractors are emotionally neutral. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2013 APA, all rights reserved).
Emotion (Washington, D.C.).Emotion.2013 Oct 7. [Epub ahead of print]
Research shows that attention is ineluctably captured away from a focal visual task by rare and unexpected changes (deviants) in an otherwise repeated stream of task-irrelevant auditory distractors (standards). The fundamental cognitive mechanisms underlying this effect have been the object of an in
PMID 24098923

Japanese Journal

医薬品産業における知的所有権の経済学的考察

石井徹
研究紀要 21, 1-18, 2015
NAID 110009912124

Unilateral Refusal to License Intellectual Property Rights : A Comparative Perspective

Espinosa Jose
現代社会文化研究 (59), 257-289, 2014-12
知的財産の使用許諾の拒絶は、反トラスト法における最も困難な問題の一つである。かかる行為は、排除する権利を基盤とする知的財産の枠組において許されている。しかしながらそれは、競争に焦点を合わせる反トラスト法によって罰せられる場合がある。反トラスト法と知的財産は両者ともに、技術革新と経済的厚生という目的において共通する。それにもかかわらず、知的財産は技術革新のプロセスにインセンティヴを与えるために投資の …
NAID 120005525357

排除型私的独占の成立要件とその認定手法に関する考察

伊永大輔,コレナガダイスケ,Daisuke KORENAGA
修道法学 36(2), 39-63, 2014-02-28
NAID 120005419344

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[1] See, e.g., United States v. United Machinery Co., 110 F. 295 (D. Mass. 1953).

[2] On the evolution of safe harbors, see Thibault Schrepel, A New Structured Rule of Reason Approach for High-Tech Markets, Suffolk University Law Review, Vol. 50, No. 1, 2017 at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2908838

[3] See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992).

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