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a definition that is stipulated by someone and that is not a standard usage
clarity of outline; "exercise had given his muscles superior definition"
a concise explanation of the meaning of a word or phrase or symbol

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出典(authority):フリー百科事典『ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』「2017/04/21 01:43:13」(JST)

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A stipulative definition is a type of definition in which a new or currently-existing term is given a new specific meaning for the purposes of argument or discussion in a given context. When the term already exists, this definition may, but does not necessarily, contradict the dictionary (lexical) definition of the term. Because of this, a stipulative definition cannot be "correct" or "incorrect"; it can only differ from other definitions, but it can be useful for its intended purpose.^[1]^[2]

For example, in the riddle of induction by Nelson Goodman, "grue" was stipulated to be "a property of an object that makes it appear green if observed before some future time t, and blue if observed afterward." "Grue" has no meaning in standard English; therefore, Goodman created the new term and gave it a stipulative definition.

On stipulative definitions

Stipulative definitions of existing terms are useful in making theoretical arguments, or stating specific cases. For example:

Suppose we say that to love someone is to be willing to die for that person.

Take "human" to mean any member of the species Homo sapiens.

For the purposes of argument, we will define a "student" to be "a person under 18 enrolled in a local school".

Some of these are also precising definitions, a subtype of stipulative definition that may not contradict but only extend the lexical definition of a term. Theoretical definitions, used extensively in science and philosophy, are similar in some ways to stipulative definitions (although theoretical definitions are somewhat normative, more like persuasive definitions).^[2]

Many holders of controversial and highly charged opinions use stipulative definitions in order to attach the emotional or other connotations of a word to the meaning they would like to give it; for example, defining "murder" as "the killing of any living thing for any reason". The other side of such an argument is likely to use a different stipulative definition for the same term: "the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought" or "the premeditated killing of a human being." The lexical definition in such a case is likely to fall somewhere in between.

When a stipulative definition is confused with a lexical definition within an argument there is a risk of equivocation.

References

^ Cline, Austin. "Stipulative Definitions". Atheism.about.com. About.com. Archived from the original on 2014-01-04. Retrieved 2017-01-10.
^ ^a ^b Hurey, Patrick J. A Concise Introduction to Logic, Cengage Learning, ISBN 978-0534089283^{[full citation needed]}

English Journal

Defining life: synthesis and conclusions.

Gayon J.Author information Institut d'Histoire et de Philosophie des Sciences et des Techniques, Université Paris 1-Panthéon Sorbonne, Université Paris 1/CNRS/ENS, 13 rue du Four, 75006 Paris, France. gayon@noos.frAbstractThe first part of the paper offers philosophical landmarks on the general issue of defining life. Section 1 defends that the recognition of "life" has always been and remains primarily an intuitive process, for the scientist as for the layperson. However we should not expect, then, to be able to draw a definition from this original experience, because our cognitive apparatus has not been primarily designed for this. Section 2 is about definitions in general. Two kinds of definition should be carefully distinguished: lexical definitions (based upon current uses of a word), and stipulative or legislative definitions, which deliberately assign a meaning to a word, for the purpose of clarifying scientific or philosophical arguments. The present volume provides examples of these two kinds of definitions. Section 3 examines three traditional philosophical definitions of life, all of which have been elaborated prior to the emergence of biology as a specific scientific discipline: life as animation (Aristotle), life as mechanism, and life as organization (Kant). All three concepts constitute a common heritage that structures in depth a good deal of our cultural intuitions and vocabulary any time we try to think about "life". The present volume offers examples of these three concepts in contemporary scientific discourse. The second part of the paper proposes a synthesis of the major debates developed in this volume. Three major questions have been discussed. A first issue (Section 4) is whether we should define life or not, and why. Most authors are skeptical about the possibility of defining life in a strong way, although all admit that criteria are useful in contexts such as exobiology, artificial life and the origins of life. Section 5 examines the possible kinds of definitions of life presented in the volume. Those authors who have explicitly defended that a definition of life is needed, can be classified into two categories. The first category (or standard view) refers to two conditions: individual self-maintenance and the open-ended evolution of a collection of similar entities. The other category refuse to include reproduction and evolution, and take a sort of psychic view of the living. Section 6 examines the relationship between the question of the definition of life and that of the origins of life. There is a close parallel between the general conceptions of the origins of life and the definitions of life.
Origins of life and evolution of the biosphere : the journal of the International Society for the Study of the Origin of Life.Orig Life Evol Biosph.2010 Apr;40(2):231-44. doi: 10.1007/s11084-010-9204-3. Epub 2010 Feb 17.
The first part of the paper offers philosophical landmarks on the general issue of defining life. Section 1 defends that the recognition of "life" has always been and remains primarily an intuitive process, for the scientist as for the layperson. However we should not expect, then, to be able to dra
PMID 20162362

The analytic-synthetic distinction and conceptual analyses of basic health concepts.

Nordby H.Author information Faculty of Health and Social work, The University College of Lillehammer, 2624 Lillehammer, Norway. halvor.nordby@hil.noAbstractWithin philosophy of medicine it has been a widespread view that there are important theoretical and practical reasons for clarifying the nature of basic health concepts like disease, illness and sickness. Many theorists have attempted to give definitions that can function as general standards, but as more and more definitions have been rejected as inadequate, pessimism about the possibility of formulating plausible definitions has become increasingly widespread. However, the belief that no definitions will succeed since no definitions have succeeded is an inductive objection, open to realist responses. The article argues that an influential argument from philosophy of language constitutes a more fundamental objection. I use disease as an example and show that this argument implies that if a common understanding of disease can be analysed into a definition, then this is a non-trivial definition. But any non-trivial analysis must be viciously circular: the analysis must presuppose that disease can be defined, but this is what the analysis is supposed to yield as a result. This means, the article concludes, that disease and other controversial health concepts do not have analyses grounded in a common language. Stipulative and contextual definitions can have local significance, but the normative roles of such definitions are at the same time limited.
Medicine, health care, and philosophy.Med Health Care Philos.2006;9(2):169-80.
Within philosophy of medicine it has been a widespread view that there are important theoretical and practical reasons for clarifying the nature of basic health concepts like disease, illness and sickness. Many theorists have attempted to give definitions that can function as general standards, but
PMID 16850197

A holistic-existential approach to health promotion.

Berg GV, Sarvimäki A.Author information The Nordic School of Public Health, Gothenburg, Sweden. gvberg@online.noAbstractHealth promotion seems to be implicit in many nursing theories, but the theoretical and philosophical basis of health promotion in nursing is not always explicitly stated. The interpretation of health promotion is closely related to the interpretation of man, health, illness and nursing. There is a need to clarify, refine and redefine health promotion in nursing because the concept is partly nonspecific and has not been used to identify a distinctive nursing focus. The aim of this study was to formulate a stipulative definition of health promotive nursing with a holistic-existential approach. A philosophical frame of reference in combination with conceptual analysis and theoretical synthesis were used as the methodological approach. The philosophical framework served as a basis in selecting the nursing theories and influenced the analysis. Two nursing theories and one nursing model were selected due to their influence on Norwegian nursing and because of their philosophical basis. Through analysis and synthesis of the selected nursing theories, the concepts man, health, illness/disease and nursing were analysed. The paper proposes a stipulative definition of health promotion in nursing based on a holistic-existential approach, supported by five necessary conditions. The definition and conditions needs to be further investigated by both empirical studies and by comparing with other relevant nursing theories, in order to formulate theoretical statements. The proposed definition may be the first step in a process of developing a theoretical framework of health promotive nursing with a holistic-existential approach.
Scandinavian journal of caring sciences.Scand J Caring Sci.2003 Dec;17(4):384-91.
Health promotion seems to be implicit in many nursing theories, but the theoretical and philosophical basis of health promotion in nursing is not always explicitly stated. The interpretation of health promotion is closely related to the interpretation of man, health, illness and nursing. There is a
PMID 14629641

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[1] Cline, Austin. "Stipulative Definitions". Atheism.about.com. About.com. Archived from the original on 2014-01-04. Retrieved 2017-01-10.

[ConciseIntro-2] Hurey, Patrick J. A Concise Introduction to Logic, Cengage Learning, ISBN 978-0534089283^{[full citation needed]}

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